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I. ‘The Functional Method’
...................................................................................................................................................................
T functional method has become both the mantra and the bête noire of com-
parative law. For its proponents it is the most, perhaps the only, fruitful method;1 to
its opponents it represents everything bad about mainstream comparative law. The
debate over the functional method is indeed much more than a methodological
dispute. It is the focal point of almost all discussions about the ﬁeld of compara-
tive law as a whole—centres versus peripheries of scholarly projects and interests,
mainstream versus avant-garde, convergence versus pluralism, instrumentalism
versus hermeneutics, technocracy versus culture, and so on.
This functional method is a chimera, in both theory and practice of comparative
law. As theory it hardly exists, at least in an elaborated version. The standard
reference text for supporters and opponents alike is a brief chapter in an introduc-
tory textbook, a text that in its original conception is almost half a century of age2
and whose author, Zweigert, expressed both disdain for methodological debate3
1 See, eg, for the United States, John Reitz, ‘How to do Comparative Law’, ()  AJCL ,
–; Mathias Reimann, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the
Twentieth Century’, ()  AJCL ,  f; for France, Marc Ancel, Utilité et méthodes de droit
comparé (),  f, –; idem, ‘Le problème de la comparabilité et la méthode fonctionnelle en droit
comparé’, in Festschrift für Imre Zajtay (), –; for England, Hugh Collins, ‘Methods and Aims of
Comparative Contract Law’, ()  Oxford Journal of Legal Studies –; Peter de Cruz, Com-
parative Law in a Changing World (nd edn, ),  ﬀ; for Germany, Hein Kötz, ‘Comparative Law
in Germany Today’, ()  RIDC ,  f; for Scandinavia, Michael Bogdan, Comparative Law
(), –; for a socialist perspective, Imre Szabó, ‘Theoretical Questions of Comparative Law’, in
Imre Szabó and Zoltán Péteri (eds), A Socialist Approach to Comparative Law (), , –; for rise
and fall in Italy, Pier Giuseppe Monateri, ‘Critique et diﬀérence: Le droit comparé en Italie’, () 
RIDC ,  f.
2 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (trans Tony Weir, rd edn,
), –, ﬁrst published in Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung (vol I, ), –; Konrad
Zweigert, ‘Methodological Problems in Comparative Law’, ()  Israel LR –. Earlier versions
are Konrad Zweigert, ‘Méthodologie du droit comparé’, in Mélanges oﬀerts à Jacques Maury (vol I,
), – = ‘Zur Methode der Rechtsvergleichung’, ()  Studium Generale—Zeitschrift für die
Einheit der Wissenschaften im Zusammenhang ihrer Begriﬀsbildung und Forschungsmethoden –;
Ernst von Caemmerer and Konrad Zweigert, ‘Évolution et état actuel de la méthode du droit comparé
en allemagne’, in Livre du Centenaire de la société de législation comparée (), , –. The
functional approach to comparative law had been practised in Germany and elsewhere earlier; see
Max Rheinstein, ‘Comparative Law and Conﬂict of Laws in Germany’, (–)  University of Chicago
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and a preference for inspiration over methodological rigour as the comparatist’s
ultimate guide.4 Even a seminal text like Zweigert’s cannot possibly provide all
elements of a theory, nor suﬃce to refute all criticism directed against it. Moreover,
even a spurious overview of comparative law theory reveals that functionalism is,
and has always been, only one of several approaches towards micro-comparison. At
least three main current approaches other than functionalism remain:5 compara-
tive legal history, the study of legal transplants, and the comparative study of legal
cultures.
Concerning practice, the functional approach underlies some famous successful
and methodologically explicit studies, but they are famous in no small part because
they are so rare.6 More often, for supporters and opponents alike, ‘functional
method’ merely serves as shorthand for traditional comparative law. Two recent
works on similar topics illustrate this. Stefan Vogenauer explicitly places his com-
prehensive comparative study of statutory interpretation within the functional
tradition,7 although his analysis focuses on forms of legal argument rather than
functions. In contrast, Mitchel Lasser describes the method behind his comparison
of judicial styles as a (cultural) analysis of mentalités,8 but then he explains diﬀerent
LR , ; Hans G. Ficker, ‘L’état du droit comparé en Allemagne’, ()  RIDC , –;
M. Schmitthoﬀ, ‘The Science of Comparative Law’, (–)  Cambridge LJ ,  ﬀ; Tullio Ascarelli,
Studi di diritto comparato e in tema di interpretazione (),  ﬀ.
3 Below, n .
4 See Zweigert and Kötz (n ), , expressing approval of a statement by Gustav Radbruch,
Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft (th edn, ),  (‘Wissenschaften, die sich mit ihrer eigenen
Methodenlehre zu beschäftigen Anlaß haben, sind kranke Wissenschaften’; ‘. . . sciences which have to
busy themselves with their own methodology are sick sciences’); but cf the more distanced attitude in
Zweigert, ‘Zur Methode’ (n ),  (‘mag auf sich beruhen’). See already Franz von Liszt, ‘Das “richtige
Recht” in der Strafgesetzgebung’, in Konrad Zweigert and Hans-Jürgen Puttfarken (eds), Rechtsver-
gleichung (), , ; originally in ()  Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft –:
‘Es pﬂegen nicht eben die schaﬀenskräftigsten unter den Gelehrten zu sein, die sich der Erörterung
methodologischer Fragen zuwenden’ (Usually, the scholars who deal with issues of methodology are
not the most productive ones).
5 cf the lists in Béatrice Jaluzot, ‘Méthodologie du droit comparé: Bilan et prospective’, ()
 RIDC ,  ﬀ; Alessandro Somma, ‘Al capezzale del malato? Riﬂessioni sul metodo comparatis-
tico’, ()  Rivista critica del diritto privato –; also in idem, Tecniche e valori nella ricerca
comparatistica (), –.
6 Michele Graziadei, ‘The Functional Heritage’, in Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday (eds),
Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (), ,  f.; Vernon Valentine Palmer,
‘From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’, ()  AJCL ,
. Annelise Riles, ‘Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information’, () 
Harvard International LJ ,  f calls functionalism a ‘compromised methodology’.
7 Stefan Vogenauer, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in England und auf dem Kontinent (vol I, ),
 n ; see now also idem, ‘Eine gemeineuropäische Methodenlehre des Rechts: Plädoyer und
Programm’, ()  Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht , –.
8 Mitchel de S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, Judicial Deliberations (), ; cf idem, ‘The Question of
Understanding’, in Legrand and Munday (n ), –.
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styles of legal systems as equivalent regarding the functions they serve: transparency,
judicial accountability, and control.9
In short, ‘the functional method’ is a triple misnomer. First, there is not one
(‘the’) functional method, but many. Second, not all allegedly functional methods
are ‘functional’ at all. Third, some projects claiming adherence to it do not even
follow any recognizable ‘method’. Does functionalist comparative law actually have
any meaning? Functionalist comparatists agree on some important elements. First,
functionalist comparative law is factual, it focuses not on rules but on their eﬀects,
not on doctrinal structures and arguments, but on events. As a consequence, its
objects are often judicial decisions as responses to real life situations, and legal
systems are compared by considering their various judicial responses to similar
situations. Second, functionalist comparative law combines its factual approach
with the theory that its objects must be understood in the light of their functional
relation to society. Law and society are thus thought to be separable but related.
Consequently, and third, function itself serves as tertium comparationis. Institu-
tions, both legal and non-legal, even doctrinally diﬀerent ones, are comparable if
they are functionally equivalent, if they fulﬁl similar functions in diﬀerent legal
systems. A fourth element, not shared by all variants of functional method, is that
functionality can serve as an evaluative criterion. Functionalist comparative law
then becomes a ‘better-law comparison’—the better of several laws is that which
fulﬁls its function better than the others.
This chapter tries to reconstruct and evaluate functionalist comparative law by
placing it within the larger framework of other disciplines, especially the social
sciences. It is of course a risk for a comparative lawyer to use disciplines foreign to
his own—sociology, anthropology, philosophy—as lenses on his own discipline.
But comparatists know that looking through the eyes of foreign law enables us
better to understand our own, so looking through the eyes of foreign disciplines
should similarly help us better to understand our own discipline. Such an inter-
disciplinary analysis yields three promises. First, the interdisciplinary look should
enable a (re-)construction of a more theoretically grounded functional method of
comparative law than is usually presented (Section II). This should reveal its con-
nections with and its peculiarities within both the development of comparative law
and the development of functionalism in other disciplines. Second, the inter-
disciplinary approach should help formulate and evaluate the concept in order to
determine how functional the method really is (Section III). Just as comparative
law can borrow from the development of functional methods in the social sciences,
so it can borrow from the development of critique. However, comparative law is
not a social science, and herein lies the third promise of an interdisciplinary
9 Lasser, Judicial Deliberations (n ),  ﬀ; see also idem, ‘Is there a Transatlantic Common Core of
Judicial Discourse?’, in Mauro Bassani and Ugo Mattei (eds), The Common Core of European Private
Law () –.
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approach: The comparison with functionalism in other disciplines may reveal what
is special about functionalism in comparative law, and why what in other discip-
lines would rightly be regarded as methodological shortcomings may in fact be
fruitful for comparative law.
II. Concepts of Functionalism
...................................................................................................................................................................
In , Konrad Zweigert postulated a methodological monopoly: ‘The basic meth-
odological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality.’10 Twelve years
before him, Kingsley David had done something similar for sociology and social
anthropology when he had called structural-functional analysis, ‘in eﬀect, syno-
nymous with sociological analysis’.11 Similarly again, Laura Kalman remarked that
the statement that we are all (legal) realists now ‘has been made so frequently that
it has become a truism to refer to it as a truism’.12
Such claims of monopoly suggest a lack of conceptual clarity, or a lack of
theoretical sophistication, or both. If functionalism is the only method in a discip-
line, chances are that either the discipline does not recognize all of its potential, or
the notion of functional method is itself inﬂated into a meaninglessly broad con-
cept. Indeed, neither Davis nor Kalman thought a speciﬁed version of functional-
ism had won the day in their respective disciplines. Davis proposed to drop the
notion of functionalism because it blurred the underlying methodological diﬀer-
ences.13 Similarly, the ‘we are all realists now’ quote has been used as a strategy to
conceal the special contributions of legal realism14 rather than to adopt their gen-
eral ones, a way of beating realism by embracing it to death. If we are all functional-
ists of comparative law, as Zweigert proclaims, then functionalism cannot mean
very much. (Nor, as one tends to overlook, can its rejection by its critics.)
The reconstruction of a more precise concept of functionalism in each discipline
10 Zweigert and Kötz (n ), .
11 Kingsley Davis, ‘The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and
Anthropology’, ()  American Sociological Review , .
12 Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, – (), . See also Lawrence Rosen, ‘Beyond
Compare’, in Legrand and Munday (n ), , , ending his critique of functionalism by proclaim-
ing: ‘In some sense, of course, we are all functionalists and that is all to the good inasmuch as it leads
us to see connections we might not otherwise have thought obtained’.
13 For example Radcliﬀe-Brown called himself an anti-functionalist just in order to distinguish
himself from the other great functionalist, Malinowski: Alfred R. Radcliﬀe-Brown, ‘Functionalism: A
Protest’, ()  American Anthropologist , .
14 See, most recently, Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Realist Conception of Law’, () Tel Aviv University
Law Faculty Papers .
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reveals another, less obvious but more important, problem—functionalism means
diﬀerent things in diﬀerent disciplines. Superﬁcially, one would expect to ﬁnd
similarities. After all, the turn in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries away from
essentialist to functionalist methods, from observation of objects themselves to
observation of their relations amongst each other and to the whole, was so wide-
spread that one could speak of a general ‘functionalist turn’ away from essentialism
in all academic disciplines and beyond, for example, in architecture and design
(‘form follows function’). There may indeed have been no more fashionable con-
cept in the twentieth century than that of function.15 This simultaneous rise and fall
of functionalism in diﬀerent disciplines suggests a parallel, perhaps even a common
development, or evolution, of ideas.16 Similarity becomes even more plausible in
view of cross-fertilizations between disciplines:17 Ernst Cassirer transposed the
notion from mathematics and science to philosophy;18 sociologists from Comte and
Spencer via Durkheim to Parsons and Luhmann borrowed biological concepts;
lawyers like Jhering and Pound were inspired by sociological ideas of function.
But such cross-fertilization, as comparatists know well from the legal transplants
debate, is not immune to misunderstandings and alterations, known or unknown.
The story of a common development, alluring as it may be, tends to overlook
the diﬀerences between concepts and disciplines and, as a consequence, the diﬀer-
ences between diﬀerent kinds of functionalism. This is especially problematic for a
discipline like comparative law that sees its place somewhere between the social
sciences on the one hand and legal studies on the other, and that draws method-
ological inspiration from both. If the concepts and methods in these disciplines are
diﬀerent, the result can only be methodological mishmash.
In fact, one can distinguish at least seven diﬀerent concepts of functionalism
across disciplines:19 () ﬁnalism, a neo-Aristotelian functionalism based on inherent
teleology, () adaptionism, an evolutionary functionalism in a Darwinian tradition,
() classical (Durkheimian) functionalism, explaining institutions through their
usefulness for society, () instrumentalism, a normative theory of using law for
social engineering, () reﬁned functionalism, a functionalist method that replaces
certain postulates of classical functionalism with empirically testable hypotheses,
15 Reiner Wiehl, Subjektivität und System (), .
16 Connections are drawn eg by Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Hans W. Baade, Peter E. Herzog, and Edward
M. Wise, Comparative Law (th edn, ), ; Rosen (n ), .
17 For examples from writers in two diﬀerent disciplines, see the references in Robert K. Merton,
‘Manifest and Latent Functions’, in idem, Social Theory and Social Structure (), ,  n ;
reprinted eg in N. J. Demerath III and Richard A. Peterson (eds), System, Change, and Conﬂict: A
Reader on Contemporary Sociological Theory and the Debate over Functionalism (), ; Felix S.
Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Method’, ()  Columbia LR , –;
idem, ‘The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence’, (), Modern LR , .
18 Ernst Cassirer, Substanzbegriﬀ und Funktionsbegriﬀ ().
19 For another classiﬁcation of diﬀerent concepts of functionalism, see Martin Mahner and Mario
Bunge, ‘Function and Functionalism: A Synthetic Perspective’, ()  Philosophy of Science –.
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() epistemological functionalism, an epistemology that focuses on functional
relations rather than on the ontology of things, and () equivalence functional-
ism, building on these concepts but emphasizing the non-teleological, non-causal
aspect of functional relations. Largely oblivious of incompatibilities, functionalist
comparative law () uses all of these.
. Finalism
Functionalist comparative law shares its emphasis on generalities that transcend
national boundaries with the Natural law tradition, and indeed ﬁnds one of its
origins there. Kant, while positing a strict separation between ‘is’ and ‘ought,’ had
conceived the possibility of universal law based on reason. Neo-Kantians hoped to
use comparative law as a response to Kirchmann’s famous verdict on law as non-
scientiﬁc and as a way towards a rational law. In , Gustav Radbruch proposed a
Kantian version of ideal law as tertium comparationis for solutions to similar prob-
lems. This ideal law could not be deduced from the insights of comparative law
(that would have been an is/ought crossover), but its formulation could help
psychologically in the quest for better law.20 Twenty years later, Max Salomon
expanded on these thoughts and formulated the credo of modern functionalist
comparative law: Legal science, like every science, deals with universals, but these
universals are not legal norms but rather legal problems. As a consequence, a
comparison of legal norms is possible only of norms responding to the same legal
problems.21 Legal science is possible only as comparative law.
Another source lies in Aristotle’s philosophy, where the idea that law performs
some function for society in an unspeciﬁc sense can already be found. For
Aristotle, the purpose of things, their telos or causa ﬁnalis, belonged to their nature.
20 Gustav Radbruch, ‘Über die Methode der Rechtsvergleichung’, (–)  Monatsschrift für
Kriminalpsychologie und Strafrechtsreform –; reprinted in Zweigert and Puttfarken (n ), –
and in Heinrich Scholler (ed), Gustav Radbruch—Rechtsvergleichende Schriften (Gustav Radbruch
Gesamtausgabe, vol , ), –. See also idem, Rechtsphilosophie (),  (Wertbeziehung [value
relation] as scientiﬁc criterion for legal science). For a stricter application of the is/ought argument
and critical response to both Radbruch and Salomon, see Julius Binder, Philosophie des Rechts (),
 ﬀ; for the possibility of a Natural law derived from the comparison of positive laws, see von Liszt
(n ),  f; Konrad Zweigert, ‘Rechtsvergleichung als universale Interpretationsmethode’, () 
RabelsZ , –.
21 Max Salomon, Grundlegung zur Rechtsphilosophie (),  (‘Rechtswissenschaft ist nicht eine
Wissenschaft von den Rechtsnormen, sondern von den Rechtsproblemen’; legal science is a science
not of legal norms but of legal problems),  (‘Rechtsvergleichung ist Vergleichung von Lösungen
eines einheitlichen Problems’; comparative law is the comparison of solutions to a uniform problem);
for approval, see Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie (n ),  n ; Schmitthoﬀ (n ), ; Willis Santiago
Guerra Filho, ‘A dimensão processual dos direitos fundamentais e da Constituição’, () 
Revista de Informação Legislativa , –; cf Otto Sandrock, Über Sinn und Methode zivilistischer
Rechtsvergleichung (),  f.
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Underlying this was a teleological image of the world, in which everything strove
towards perfection. ‘Is’ and ‘ought’ were connected: the correct laws could be
deduced from the nature of things. Such thoughts were later rejected both in
philosophy and in legal theory, before the crisis of legal positivism spurred a
simultaneous return to Natural law and comparative law, and to Aristotelian ideals,
in the twentieth century. Once it could be shown that not only problems but also
their solutions were similar, a return to a minimal version of Natural law or at least
ius gentium, based on an Aristotelian notion of function, seemed possible. To this
end, the revived rhetorical tradition of topics could be made fruitful.22 Topics,
taking the role of problems, did not spur universal solutions by themselves, but
inspired similar analyses that might lead to similar results. Comparative law
became phenomenological:23 Comparatists viewed the solutions in diﬀerent legal
systems as responses to common problems, contingent in their form but none the
less required by the nature of the problem.
The most important theoretical treatise in this tradition and, at the same time,
one of the most important works for functionalist comparative law is Josef Esser’s
book on principles and rules in judicial lawmaking.24 Esser’s functionalism is
richer and more sophisticated than the one developed later by Zweigert, but its
central elements are strikingly similar: Institutions are contingent while problems
are universal, the function can serve as tertium comparationis, diﬀerent legal sys-
tems ﬁnd similar solutions by diﬀerent means, so universal principles of law can be
found and formulated as a system with its own terminology.25 The reason for the
similarity is that solutions are deemed inherent in problems and arguments can be
made from the Natur der Sache (the thing’s nature); a commonality of values is
both the basis for and the consequence of this. Another comparatist, more openly
in the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, is James Gordley.26 His general
approach is more philosophical than Esser’s, but in eﬀect quite similar: Gordley
22 Fritz von Hippel, Zur Gesetzmäßigkeit juristischer Systembildung (); Theodor Viehweg, Topik
und Jurisprudenz (, th edn, ; English translation under the title Topics and Law by W. Cole
Durham, ); Ernst A. Kramer, ‘Topik und Rechtsvergleichung’, ()  RabelsZ –; for the
history of legal topics, see also Jan Schröder, Recht als Wissenschaft (), – with references at 
n .
23 Alois Troller, Überall gültige Prinzipien der Rechtswissenschaft (), especially at –; idem,
‘Rechtsvergleichung und Phänomenologie’, in Mario Rotondi (ed), Inchieste di diritto comparato,
vol II: Buts et méthodes du droit comparé (), –, especially at ; both with references to
functionalist comparatists.
24 Josef Esser, Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Rechtsfortbildung (), especially at  ﬀ,
 ﬀ. Unfortunately no English translation exists; for reviews in English, see Max Rheinstein (to
whom Esser dedicated his book), ()  University of Chicago LR –; Wolfgang G. Friedmann,
()  Columbia LR –; Arthur T. von Mehren, ()  RabelsZ –. For an application of
Esser’s method by one of his students, see Dieter Rothoeft, System der Irrtumslehre als Methodenfrage
der Rechtsvergleichung ().
25 Esser (n ), ch .
26 James Gordley, ‘The Universalist Heritage’, in Legrand and Munday (n ), –; idem, The
Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (),  ﬀ.
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also sees diﬀerent laws as diﬀerent responses to the same, universal problems.27
Neo-Aristotelians postulate that comparative law can lead us to universal, common
legal principles. Diﬀerent laws provide answers to similar problems that are doc-
trinally (formally) diﬀerent but substantively similar, and their relative similarity
suggests inherently correct solutions to these problems—a Natural law, a ius
commune (Gordley), a ius gentium (Esser), or ‘universal legal principles’ (Troller).
Both Esser and Gordley call their approaches functional, and both have been
inﬂuential in functionalist comparative law. But they use function in a very speciﬁc
sense: For them it is synonymous with purpose and causa ﬁnalis. This is quite
diﬀerent from the modern notion of function as developed by Durkheim.
Durkheim explicitly distinguished an institution’s functions from its cause and
from its nature, rejected the Aristotelian fourfold concept of causa by conﬁning
‘cause’ to causa eﬃciens, and replacing end or goal (causa ﬁnalis) with function.28
Since then, the function of a thing (or a law) is normally separated not only from
the reasons for its origin and evolution,29 but also from its essence; functional
relations are separate from the things themselves. Esser’s and Gordley’s functional-
isms are diﬀerent; they must be understood against the background of Aristotelian
ontology and metaphysics and answer the criticisms brought forward against these.
. Adaptionism
Darwinism discarded the Aristotelian worldview, but it did not simultaneously
discard the teleological view of the world.30 The telos was now transferred into the
world at large; the struggle of everyone against everyone was thought to contri-
bute to the progress of the whole. Darwinian ideas inﬂuenced all disciplines in the
nineteenth century, including the new discipline of sociology and the concept of
function within it. Auguste Comte, who gave sociology its name, introduced a
vision of society as a complex organism which evolved as a whole, while its
elements all performed certain functions in this evolution. Herbert Spencer, closer
to Darwinism, conceptualized society more as a struggle of all against all, but he
also emphasized the important interplay between structures and their functions
27 See eg, James Gordley, ‘Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline?’, ()  AJCL –.
28 Émile Durkheim, Les règles de la méthode sociologique (th edn, , originally published in
–), : ‘Nous nous servons du mot de fonction de préférence à celui de ﬁn ou de but, précisé-
ment parce que les phénomènes sociaux n’existent généralement pas en vue des résultats utiles qu’ils
produisent’ (we use the word function rather than that of end or goal precisely because social
phenomena do not generally exist in view of the useful results they produce).
29 Durkheim (n ), : ‘Faire voir à quoi un fait est utile n’est pas expliquer comment il est né ni
comment il est ce qu’il est’ (showing for what a fact is useful is not the same as explaining how it
comes about nor why it is the way it is).
30 This is in dispute; for Darwin’s own views of Aristotle (whom he discovered late in life), see Allan
Gotthelf, ‘Darwin on Aristotle’, ()  Journal of the History of Biology –.
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for society.31 Not surprisingly, evolutionist thought also inﬂuenced lawyers of the
time, none more perhaps than Jhering, who argued that law developed in response
to the needs not of individuals but of society.32 For all these scholars, institutions
like the law respond, adapt to social needs; those institutions that adapt best will
survive.
This version of functionalism, which one may call adaptionism, seemed espe-
cially apt for comparative law.33 That ﬁeld had hitherto consisted largely of
comparative legal history, understood as the history and diﬀusion of ideas and
doctrines. The new sociological interest in interrelations between law and society
changed this focus. Now ideas about law were drawn neither from texts nor from
the spirit of a particular people, but from general ideas about societies and their
development. Consequently, generalization across borders became possible; com-
parative law could become a science of the way in which societies dealt with similar
problems on their paths toward progress. Central to this new approach was the
focus on the functions that both law at large and its individual institutions fulﬁlled
for society. An early example comes from Franz von Liszt, a supporter of a func-
tional criminal law in the tradition of Beccaria (and a cousin to the famous com-
poser). Liszt suggested that because punishment was necessary for maintenance of
the legal order and because the legal order in turn was necessary for the mainten-
ance and development of the state, criminal law norms had to be judged against
their ability to maintain the legal order.34 This function was useful for comparative
law; it served as the tertium comparationis for the (functional) comparison of
criminal law in diﬀerent legal orders.35 Philipp Heck, the most important propo-
nent of a jurisprudence of interests, also argued for functionalist comparative law:
Similarities of values among societies created laws diﬀerent in doctrine but similar
in results.36 Also, Roscoe Pound, while not a strict functionalist himself, shared
31 cf Jonathan H. Turner and Alexandra Maryanski, Functionalism (), –; Richard Münch,
‘Funktionalismus—Geschichte und Zukunftsperspektiven einer Theorietradition’, in Jens Jetzkowitz
and Carsten Stark (eds), Soziologischer Funktionalismus (), , –.
32 Rudolf von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht (–; English translation under the title Law as
a Means to an End by Isaac Husik, ); idem, Der Kampf ums Recht (; English translation
under the title The Struggle for Law by John J. Lalor, ); on Jhering’s concept of evolution see
Okko Behrends (ed), Privatrecht heute und Jherings evolutionäres Rechtsdenken (); Marc Amstutz,
Evolutorisches Wirtschaftsrecht () –.
33 Konrad Zweigert and Kurt Siehr, ‘Jhering’s Inﬂuence on the Development of Comparative Legal
Method’, ()  AJCL –.
34 cf Franz von Liszt, Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht (–). 35 von Liszt (n ), .
36 Philipp Heck, Begriﬀsbildung und Interessenjurisprudenz (),  f; idem, Grundriss des
Schuldrechts (), : ‘Die nationalen Rechte unterscheiden sich weniger in der Entscheidung der
Interessenkonﬂikte als in den angewendeten Gebotsbegriﬀen und Gebotssystemen. Auch in dieser
Hinsicht ﬁndet sich eine Aequivalenz der Konstruktionen und der Gebotssysteme. Die Verlegung des
Schwergewichts auf die Interessenwirkung verringert den Gegensatz.’ (National legal systems diﬀer
from each other less in how they decide between conﬂicting interests but rather in the norms and
normative systems they apply. In this way, too, we ﬁnd equivalence of constructions and systems.
Moving the emphasis on interests reduces the diﬀerence.) Heck was inspired by a review of his
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some of functionalism’s convictions. Pound was interested in ‘law in action, not
law in the books’37 and in ‘how the same things may be brought about, the same
problem may be met by one legal institution or doctrine or precept in one body of
law and by another, quite diﬀerent institution or doctrine or precept in
another’38—both central elements of functionalist comparative law.
Today, after the catastrophe of two world wars has rattled the faith both in
teleological evolutionism and in progress through law, adaptionism survives in only
a very reduced form. In political science it is used in some integration studies as an
explanation of convergence, especially of the European Union.39 But the loss of
teleology and awareness of the complexity of the world have made the simple
functionalism of means and ends harder to justify both as an explanatory theory and
as a guiding principle. Adaptionism seemed to suggest a false determinism.40 Evo-
lutionary functionalism in political science has therefore been called ideological
and ethnocentric, a criticism replicated in reference to comparative law.41
. Classical Functionalism
Sociologists interested in a value-free sociological science perceived this as an
illegitimate faith in progress and tried to develop a non-teleological functionalism
instead. These eﬀorts can be traced back to Émile Durkheim, who introduced two
important ideas. First, he separated functions from origins and established func-
tions as relations between, not qualities of, elements. Second, he emphasized that
the goals of individuals were contingent and therefore not the valid material of
scientiﬁc endeavours; sociology as a science had to focus on objective functions.42
Both steps had crucial implications. As long as the ends or goals of an institution
property book by Max Rheinstein, ()  Juristische Wochenschrift , : ‘Die Rechtsverglei-
chung ist eine notwendige Ergänzung und Weiterführung der Interessenjurisprudenz’ (comparative
law is a necessary supplement and continuation of jurisprudence of interests). See also Heinrich
Schoppmeyer, Juristische Methode als Lebensaufgabe (),  f with n .
37 Roscoe Pound, ‘Law in the Books and Law in Action’, ()  American LR –; cf Karl H.
Neumayer, ‘Fremdes Recht aus Büchern, fremde Rechtswirklichkeit und die funktionelle Dimension
in den Methoden der Rechtsvergleichung’, ()  RabelsZ –.
38 Roscoe Pound, ‘What May We Expect from Comparative Law?, ()  ABAJ , .
39 David Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of Inter-
national Organization (); Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International
Organization (); David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Working for Peace: the Functional
Approach, Functionalism and Beyond’, in idem (eds), New Perspectives on International Functionalism
(), –; Jürg Martin Gabriel, ‘Die Renaissance des Funktionalismus’, ()  Aussenwirtschaft
–.
40 Robert W. Gordon, ‘Critical Legal Histories’, ()  Stanford LR –; Günter Frankenberg,
‘Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law’, ()  Harvard International LJ , .
41 Léontin-Jean Constantinesco, Traité de droit comparé, vol III: La science des droits comparés
(), .
42 Durkheim (n ),  ﬀ.
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had been its inherent elements, any explanation had to be teleological, and an
analysis would have to focus either on the will of a transcendent creator or on the
inherent nature of things. If institutions were deﬁned by the purposes deﬁned by
their creators, a systematic analysis had to be impossible, for individual goals were
hard to observe as well as arbitrary and contingent. The emphasis on objective
functions on the other hand, distinct from both origin and purpose, allowed the
search for general laws, the goal of all sciences. Still, Durkheim did think an
institution’s existence and its function interrelated. On the one hand, causes often
determine functions: An institution is established in order to maintain a certain
status quo, and it then fulﬁls that function. On the other hand, functions often
determine if not the origin then at least the persistence of institutions:43 Dys-
functional institutions cannot compete with more eﬃcient institutions, societies
with wasteful, dysfunctional institutions cannot survive.44
Several elements of Durkheim’s functionalism reappear in functionalist com-
parative law: the scientiﬁc character and objectivity of research, a perception of
society as a whole that transcends the sum of its parts because its elements are
interrelated, the idea that societies have needs, the idea that law can be understood
in terms of the needs it meets, a focus on observable facts rather than individual
ideas (law in action versus law in the books), the discovered similarity of institu-
tions of diﬀerent societies, and the competitive advantage of more functional
institutions within one society’s law and of societies with better laws vis-á-vis other
societies. None the less, although Durkheim himself was a trained lawyer, his
functionalism had less immediate impact on comparative law than his concept of
social facts. Saleilles followed Durkheim (and Weber) in maintaining that com-
parative law ‘cherche à déﬁnir le type d’idéal tout relatif qui se dégage de la
comparaison des législations, de leur fonctionnement et de leurs résultats’ and in
emphasizing ‘l’unité des résultats dans la diversité des formes juridiques d’applica-
tion’.45 But most comparatists in the Durkheimian tradition focused rather on
a non-teleological comparative legal history than on functional analysis46 and
opposed more functionalist versions of comparative law.47
43 See also Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Causation and Functionalism in Sociology (), eg  f.
44 Durkheim (n ),  f.
45 Raymond Saleilles, ‘Conception et objet de la science du droit comparé’, in Congrès international
de droit comparé: Procès verbaux (vol I, ), , , .
46 Roger Cotterell, ‘Comparatists and Sociology’, in Legrand and Munday (n ), ,  ﬀ.
47 Pierre Lepaulle, ‘The Function of Comparative Law: With a Critique of Sociological Juris-
prudence’, (–)  Harvard LR –; also in Zweigert and Puttfarken (n ), –.
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. Instrumentalism
One reason why comparatists lacked interest in Durkheimian sociology may have
been that they did not share the social scientists’ fear of normativity. Instead,
comparatists embraced an oﬀspring of adaptionism that was popular in law:
instrumentalism. If law fulﬁls functions and meets societal needs, then the lawyer’s
job is to develop laws that perform these tasks (‘social engineering’), and compara-
tive law can help compare the ability of diﬀerent solutions to solve similar problems,
and spur similar degrees of progress.
These ideas, which can be found already in Jhering’s work, became prevalent in
legal realism. Realism made functionalism fashionable not only in academic writ-
ing but also for curriculum reform proposals.48 One strand of realism starts from
the sociological concept of function, but then translates objective functions into
purposes to be set by legislatures. These realists substitute teleological analysis for
Durkheim’s objective science, and they assume that the eﬀect of laws on society
can be both measured and controlled. While American legal realists remained
surprisingly uninterested in comparative law, European comparative law was
inﬂuenced. Zweigert and Kötz put it bluntly: ‘Law is “social engineering” and legal
science is a social science. Comparative lawyers recognize this: it is, indeed, the
intellectual and methodological starting point of their discipline.’49 Such ideas
became especially attractive to the law and development movement, which hoped
to use law in order to aid the economic progress of developing countries—a
combination of the Darwinian faith in progress and teleology with the instru-
mentalist’s hope placed in law. Such ideas, out of fashion for some time,50 have
recently been revitalized, speciﬁcally for former communist economies, generally
in the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ project.51 Yet they face problems.52 First,
researchers frequently place naïve faith in both the mono-functionality and
eﬀectiveness of legal institutions. Second, they are often insuﬃciently aware of the
non-legal elements of success or failure of societies, including cultural diﬀerences.53
Experience in domestic contexts has shown that social engineering through law is
far more complex than one thought; the insight still has to make its way into
comparative law.54
48 Brainerd Currie, ‘The Materials of Law Study, ()  Journal of Legal Education –.
49 Zweigert and Kötz (n ), .
50 David M. Trubek, ‘Towards a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and
Development’, ()  Yale LJ –.
51 www.doingbusiness.org (last accessed  July ).
52 See, most recently, Kerry Rittich, ‘Functionalism and Formalism: Their Latest Incarnations in
Contemporary Development and Governance Debates’, ()  University of Toronto LJ –.
53 Jan Torpman and Fredrik Jörgensen, ‘Legal Eﬀectiveness’, ()  Archiv für Rechts- und
Sozialphilosophie –; Association Henri Capitant, Les droits de tradition civiliste en question—A
propos des Rapports Doing Business de la Banque Mondiale vol  ().
54 A more nuanced analysis is Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-François Richard, ‘The
Transplant Eﬀect’, ()  AJCL –.
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. Reﬁned Functionalism
Developments in the social sciences also contributed to their disjunction from
comparative law: sociological functionalism became more complex and thereby
less useful for functionalist comparative law. The work of Radcliﬀe-Browne,
Malinowski, and Parsons has had little direct response in comparative law, mostly
because their interest in a theory of societal systems was not congruent with the
search in comparative law for a method. But comparative lawyers have also ignored
sociologists interested in functionalism as a method. In particular, Robert Merton’s
seminal text on latent functions should have shown the problems of translating
functionalism into comparative law.55
First, Merton introduces the important distinction between manifest functions
(functions intended and recognized by participants) and latent (unknown and
unintended) functions.56 Separating objective functions from subjective intentions
has a pedagogical eﬀect: it points researchers to the importance of latent functions,
which yield more important insights precisely because they previously went
unrecognized.57 Comparative lawyers are sometimes in accord when they focus on
what the courts do in fact, as opposed to what they say they are doing. Yet when
lawyers wish to use comparative law for social engineering, they forget that legis-
latures cannot know latent functions precisely because these functions are only
latent. Social engineering presumes unrealistically simple relations between society
and laws.
A second contribution is Merton’s challenge to the postulate of functional unity
of society—the axiom, shared by Rabel and Zweigert,58 that societies are so inte-
grated and interdependent that changing one element aﬀects all others. In
response, Merton suggests that diﬀerent societies are integrated to diﬀerent degrees
and empirical tests are necessary to determine this degree.59
Merton’s third challenge attacks the assumption that every element in society
fulﬁls some vital function, ignoring non-functional or even dysfunctional institu-
tions. Such institutions, so-called survivals, were known in both sociology and
55 Merton (n ). An early version of the argument was published as ‘Sociological Theory’, ()
 American Journal of Sociology –.
56 Merton (n ), , –; see already idem, ‘The Unintended Consequences of Purposive
Social Action’, ()  American Sociological Review –.
57 Merton (n ), .
58 See eg Ernst Rabel, ‘Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung’, ()  Rheinische
Zeitschrift für Zivil- und Prozeßrecht , ; reprinted in Hans G. Leser (ed), Ernst Rabel, Gesammelte
Aufsätze (vol III, ), ,  and in Zweigert and Puttfarken (n ), , : ‘Alles das bedingt sich
gegenseitig in sozialer, wirtschaftlicher, rechtlicher Gestaltung . . . Alle diese vibrierenden Körper
zusammen bilden ein noch von niemandem mit Anschauung erfaßtes Ganzes’ (Everything in the
social, economic, and legal ﬁelds interacts . . . All these vibrating bodies in their ensemble form a
whole that no one has yet fully realized); quoted approvingly by Zweigert and Kötz (n ), .
59 Merton (n ), –.
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functionalist comparative law.60 But traditional sociologists and anthropologists,
and likewise comparative lawyers, consider survivals to be unstable and only tem-
porary. Merton in turn emphasizes that whether institutions are functional or not
is a matter of empirical research,61 a point made forcefully in comparative law from
an anti-functionalist perspective by Alan Watson.62
Merton’s critique was powerful, while his constructive ‘paradigm for functional
analysis in sociology’,63 was less successful. (This is similar to Felix Cohen’s article
on legal functionalism,64 which contains, in its ﬁrst part, a brilliant critique of
conceptualism, while its second part, developing a constructive theory of values, is
much weaker.) Criticism of sociological functionalism grew.65 Functionalism is
criticized as intrinsically teleological and therefore unable to fulﬁl Durkheim’s own
postulate of a value-free social science.66 Related to this is a criticism of implicit
tautology and circularity,67 mirrored in comparative law:68 The survival of societies
is explained by the existence of institutions, while the existence of these institutions
is explained in turn by the needs of society. For critics this means either that
functional relations are no diﬀerent from causal relations (and therefore dispens-
able as a separate category) or that teleology is reintroduced into sociology.69 Other
critics go against the programme of functionalism. For them, emphasis on the
stability of systems makes its proponents both politically conservative and meth-
odologically incapable of explaining social change70—again, a criticism raised also
60 See eg Durkheim (n ), ; also Zweigert and Kötz (n ),  on the non-functional German
provision on ‘joke transactions’, §  BGB; ibid  on the dysfunctional role of §  BGB (delictual
liability for others) and functional equivalents in German law.
61 Merton (n ), –.
62 See eg Alan Watson, Legal Transplants (), –; cf Folke Schmidt, ‘The Need for a Multi-axial
Method in Comparative Law’, in Festschrift für Konrad Zweigert (), , ; Frankenberg, 
Harvard International LJ  f; Graziadei (n ), .
63 Merton (n ), –.
64 Cohen,  Columbia LR  ﬀ. On Cohen’s own concept of functionalism, akin to sociological
positivism rather than to sociological functionalism, see Martin Golding, ‘Realism and Functionalism
in the Legal Thought of Felix S. Cohen’, ()  Cornell LR ,  ﬀ.
65 Two inﬂuential collections of essays are Demerath and Peterson (n ) and Don Martindale (ed),
Functionalism in the Social Sciences: The Strength and Limits of Functionalism in Anthropology, Econom-
ics, Political Science, and Sociology ().
66 Ernest Nagel, ‘A Formalization of Functionalism’, in idem, Logic without Metaphysics (),
 ﬀ; reprinted in Demerath and Peterson (n ), –; Carl G. Hempel, ‘The Logic of Functionalism’,
in Llewellyn Gross (ed), Symposium on Sociological Theory (), –; Frankenberg,  Harvard
International LJ .
67 See Turner and Maryanski (n ),  ﬀ; Mark Abrahamson, Functionalism (),  ﬀ.
68 Vivian Curran, ‘Cultural Immersion, Diﬀerence and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law’, ()
 AJCL , .
69 Ernest Nagel, ‘A Formalization of Functionalism with Special Reference to its Application in the
Social Sciences’, in idem, Logic without Metaphysics (), –, reprinted in abbreviated form in
Demerath and Peterson (n ), –; for a defence, see Isajiw (n ).
70 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Struktur und Funktion’, ()  Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und
Sozialpsychologie –; idem, ‘Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis’,
()  American Journal of Sociology –; reprinted in Demerath and Peterson (n ), –.
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against functionalist comparative law.71 And ﬁnally, and perhaps most importantly,
sociological functionalism is considered unable to account for culture, in particular
to explain practices that serve no function—another critique also of comparative
law.72 In general, Parsons’s ‘grand theory’ was considered too abstract and there-
fore often unable to predict all empirical ﬁndings,73 again a concern shared in
comparative law.74
After these critiques, functionalism lost ground; a proclaimed ‘neofunctional-
ism’ has not been successful.75 Within sociology and especially social anthropology,
functionalism made way for cultural and hermeneutic methods76—a ‘cultural
turn’ reﬂected in legal studies generally77 and comparative law speciﬁcally.78 At the
same time, sociology as a discipline, not least due to the perceived lack of method-
ological sophistication, had to yield its once leading position within the social
sciences to economics, again, a development replicated in comparative law.79
Legal functionalism has faced similar challenges. Already before , criticism
of the German Civil Code’s structure as non-functional remained unheard;80 later
71 Jonathan Hill, ‘Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory’, ()  Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies ,  f; David Kennedy, ‘The Methods and the Politics’, in Legrand and Munday (n ),
, .
72 One author representing the trend in both anthropology and comparative law is Cliﬀord Geertz;
for anthropological anti-functionalism, see his ‘Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example’,
()  American Anthropologist –; reprinted in Demerath and Peterson (n ), –; Cliﬀord
Geertz, Interpreting Cultures (); for anti-functionalist comparative law, see idem, ‘Local Know-
ledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective’ in idem, Local Knowledge—Further Essays in
Interpretive Anthropology (), –, especially at . See also Pierre Legrand, ‘The Same and the
Diﬀerent’, in Legrand and Munday (n ), ,  f.
73 Wright Mills, ‘Grand Theory’, in idem, The Sociological Imagination (); reprinted in Demerath
and Peterson (n ), –.
74 See the references in n ; William Alford, ‘On the Limits of “Grand Theory” in Comparative
Law’, ()  Washington LR –.
75 Jeﬀrey C. Alexander, Neofunctionalism and After (); cf Michael Schmid, ‘Der Neofunktiona-
lismus: Nachruf auf ein Forschungsprogramm’, in Jetzkowitz and Stark (n ), –.
76 Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Avery Hunt (eds), Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the
Study of Society and Culture ().
77 See eg Austin Sarat and Jonathan Simons (eds), Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies and the Law:
Moving beyond Legal Realism ().
78 The general theme for the  Conference of the American Society of Comparative Law will be
‘Comparative Law and Culture’.
79 For connections, see Anne Sophia-Marie van Aaken, ‘Vom Nutzen der ökonomischen Theorie
des Rechts für die Rechtsvergleichung’, in Prinzipien des Privatrechts und Rechtsvereinheitlichung:
Jahrbuch junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler  (), –; Reinier Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry
Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, and Edward Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate
Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach to Corporate Law (); Peter Behrens, ‘Ökonomische
Wirkungsanalyse im Kontext funktionaler Rechtsvergleichung’ (unpublished paper delivered at the
 Conference of the German Society for Comparative Law in Würzburg; summary in []
Juristenzeitung ).
80 Ralf Michaels, ‘Strukturfragen des Schuldrechts’, in Reinhard Zimmermann, Joachim Rückert,
and Mathias Schmoeckel (eds), Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB (vol II, forthcoming), vor
§ , no. .
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abuses of functionalism by the Nazis81 made the concept unattractive in the post-
war period. Instead, the paradigm for statutory interpretation and legal argumen-
tation moved from a functionalist jurisprudence of interests to a jurisprudence of
values, thereby substituting the legislator’s individual goals or a speciﬁc society’s
values for objective functions and abolishing the universalist aims of functionalism
which had made it attractive for comparative law.
. Epistemological Functionalism
All proponents of functionalism discussed so far stand before a dilemma. Either
they must explain function as mere causality, or they have to insert some kind of
teleology into their worldview, some ‘Natur der Sache’. A way out can be found in
Ernst Cassirer’s functionalist epistemology. Cassirer posits that, since Kant sug-
gested laws of nature as human constructs, there has been a seismic shift from a
focus on substance to a focus on function, from attempts to understand how things
‘really’ are (their substance, ontology) to understanding them only in their (func-
tional) relation to particular viewpoints (their function, epistemology).82 No longer
could classes of elements be deﬁned simply by common traits, because such an
abstraction would ignore the necessary relation between the element and the whole.
Rather, individual elements had to be understood in relation to particular aspects, as
diﬀerent results to the same function. A series of elements a α1 β1, a α2 β2, a α3 β3 . . .
cannot be understood merely by the common criterion a, but rather by the regular-
ity in which its elements are brought about through the function a x y, in which the
variable x deﬁnes all α, the variable y deﬁnes all β, and all these elements stand in a
functional regularity so that it is possible to create new elements in the series.
This move has two decisive advantages. First, it is not necessary to recognize some
essence of a particular element; it is suﬃcient to understand the element as variable
result of a functional connection with another variable element. Individual num-
bers do not have an essence, but the totality of all numbers does.83 Functionalism
need not declare the existence of any α or any β but only that if there is a certain α
there will be a certain β. Second, it is possible to conceive of groups of elements and
to describe them without the loss of speciﬁcity that comes with traditional classiﬁ-
cations requiring abstraction.84 The function a x y describes all elements of the
81 Vivian Grosswald Curran, ‘Fear of Formalism: Indications from the Fascist Period in France and
Germany of Judicial Methodology’s Impact on Substantive Law’, ()  Cornell International LJ
,  ﬀ.
82 Cassirer (n ); for a less inﬂuential approach, see Laurence J. Laﬂeur, ‘Epistemological Func-
tionalism’, ()  The Philosophical Review ,  ﬀ. Heinrich Rombach, Substanz, System, Struk-
tur: Die Ontologie des Funktionalismus und der philosophische Hintergrund der modernen Wissenschaft
(vol , ),  ﬀ, sees the roots of functionalism in the work of Cusanus and Descartes.
83 Cassirer (n ),  f. 84 cf Cassirer (n ),  ﬀ,  ﬀ.
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series completely, whereas a focus on the common element a as classiﬁcatory
criterion would ignore both the diﬀerences between two elements a α1 β1 and a α2 β2
as well as the speciﬁc functional relation between a and y that creates the respective
elements.
Although Cassirer had no direct inﬂuence on functionalist comparative law,85
several parallels exist. First, functionalist comparative law is also interested not in
some essence of legal institutions, but rather in their functional relation to particu-
lar problems. Second, functionalist comparative law also aims at avoiding the
abstraction inherent in both conceptual comparisons and the macro-comparison
of legal families, and instead focuses on a legal institution’s relation to the whole.
Third, Cassirer’s emphasis on the totality of elements as opposed to individual
elements is akin to Max Salomon’s attempt to deﬁne universal jurisprudence
beyond individual national institutions. Cassirer’s concept of function, which he
borrowed from mathematics, can work as a formalization of functional equivalents
in comparative law: If we deﬁne a as a particular problem, ‘x’ as the variable for
legal systems α1, 2, 3 . . ., and ‘y’ as the variable for legal institutions β1, 2, 3 . . ., we
can formalize the functional comparison of diﬀerent legal institutions as a series,
where, for example, a α1 β1 is French law’s (α1) response (β1) to problem a, a α2 β2 is
German law’s (α2) response (β2) to the same problem a, and so on. This approach
enables the comparatist to focus not only on the similarity between institutions
(the common problem a and the institutions’ similar ability to respond to it) but
also on the diﬀerences (between α1 and α2, and between β1 and β2, respectively), and
furthermore allows her to explain these diﬀerences between institutions as a func-
tion (!) of the diﬀerences between legal systems. Such formalization, while raising
many problems (eg whether the social sciences reveal the same degree of regularity
as do mathematics and the natural sciences), is a promising step towards more
rational comparative law.
. Equivalence Functionalism
The insight that diﬀerent elements can respond to the same problem is crucial.
Finalism, adaptionism, and classical functionalism all contain traces of determinism
and teleology: if similar problems cause similar solutions, then the solutions must
somehow be inherent in the problems, and similar functions must be fulﬁlled by
the same kinds of institutions. Durkheim expressly rejected functional equivalence
as ﬁnalist and proclaimed a remarkable similarity between institutions of diﬀerent
85 However, Max Hartmann’s somewhat comparable philosophy of science did inﬂuence Georges
Langrod, ‘Quelques réﬂexions méthodologiques sur la comparaison en science juridique’, () 
RIDC ,  ﬀ; reprinted in Zweigert and Puttfarken (n ), ,  ﬀ.
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societies as responses to functional requirements.86 Goldschmidt’s otherwise ori-
ginal study of comparative functionalism in anthropology claimed that ‘certain
social needs repeatedly call forth similar social institutions, that correlations
between institutional forms can be found because, broadly speaking, they are the
“natural” or “preferred” means by which certain necessary social tasks may best
be performed in given circumstances’.87 Even Rabel marvelled at the ﬁnding of
‘essentially related institutions and developments’.88
Given how diﬀerent institutions are in detail, such a view is hard to maintain
except in very abstract analysis; the similar institutions must be ideal types. Com-
parative lawyers, with their focus on details and speciﬁcities, have long known
this. They knew on the one hand that similar institutions can fulﬁl diﬀerent func-
tions in diﬀerent societies or at diﬀerent times,89 and they found, on the other
hand, that similar functional needs can be fulﬁlled by diﬀerent institutions, the
idea of the functional equivalent. This idea, central to functionalist comparative
law, appears in all kinds of functionalism: Max Salomon’s focus on problems as
the unifying element of general jurisprudence enabled scholars to see diﬀerent
solutions as functionally equivalent;90 Josef Esser developed the concept for com-
parative law;91 and Konrad Zweigert made it the central point of his approach to
comparative law and an important tool in seeing universalities in what may look
like diﬀerences.92
Indeed, the recognition of functional equivalents gave a boost to the possibilities
for comparative law. In particular, the comparison between common law and civil
law has traditionally tempted functionalists, for two reasons: First, functionalist
comparison overcomes the epistemic/doctrinal diﬀerence between civil and com-
mon law by declaring it functionally irrelevant. Second, the common law with its
86 Durkheim (n ), : ‘En fait, quand on est entré quelque peu en contact avec les phénomènes
sociaux, on est . . . surpris de l’étonnante régularité avec laquelle ils se reproduisent dans les mêmes
circonstances. Même les pratiques les plus minutieuses et, en apparence, les plus puériles, se répètent
avec la plus étonnante uniformité.’ (In fact, once on gets into some contact with social phenomena,
one is surprised at the astonishing regularity with which they are reproduced under the same
circumstances. Even the most minute practices and the seemingly most puerile ones are repeated with
the most astonishing uniformity.)
87 Walter Goldschmidt, Comparative Functionalism: An Essay in Anthropological Theory (), ;
see also : ‘similar problems evoke similar solutions’.
88 Rabel,  Rheinische Zeitschrift für Zivil- und Prozeßrecht  (‘wesensverwandte Einrichtungen
und Entwicklungen’).
89 Karl Renner, Die Rechtsinstitute des Privatrechts und ihre soziale Funktion: ein Beitrag zur Kritik
des Bürgerlichen Rechts (; English translation under the title The Institutions of Private Law and
their Social Functions by Agnes Schwarzschild, edited by Otto Kahn-Freund, ).
90 Salomon (n ). 91 Esser (n ), especially at  ﬀ.
92 Konrad Zweigert, ‘Des solutions identiques par des voies diﬀérentes’, ()  RIDC –; for a
German version, see ‘Die “praesumptio similitudinis” als Grundsatzvermutung rechtsvergleichender
Methode’, in Rotondi (n ), –; a partial English translation can be found in Volkmar Gessner,
Armin Hoeland, and Csaba Varga (eds), European Legal Cultures (), –.
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organic development should be particularly apt for functional understanding. Not
surprisingly then, some of the most inﬂuential works applying the functional
method have focused on institutions from the common law and their functional
equivalents in the civil law, for example trusts93 and consideration.94 Some even
found functionalism helpful for intersystemic comparison between socialist and
capitalist legal systems.95 Yet equivalence functionalism in comparative law has
always been explicated by examples rather than developed theoretically.96 Thus, it
is not clear whether functional equivalence suggests some uniformity of values
beyond the universality of problems. Likewise, the concept of a function suggests
a comparatively naïve relation between the problem and the institution, either
between cause and eﬀect (so that the problem causes an institution to exist), or
between purpose and implementation (so that a legal solution serves the purpose
of solving a recognized problem).
Here, comparative law could proﬁt from sociological equivalence functionalism
as developed especially by Niklas Luhmann (who in turn was inﬂuenced not only
by Merton but also by Cassirer). Merton questioned the postulate of indispens-
ability, according to which every element in a society is indispensable for the
working of the system, and pointed out that even indispensable necessities can be
met by diﬀerent institutions that act as functional substitutes or functional equiva-
lents.97 Cassirer’s epistemology provided a formalized version of the argument.
Functional equivalence means that similar problems may lead to diﬀerent solu-
tions; the solutions are similar only in their relation to the speciﬁc function under
which they are regarded. Luhmann brings the two together to overcome a main
problem of classical functionalism—the problem that functions either are nothing
more than causal relations, or contain an element of teleology. Equivalence func-
tionalism by contrast explains an institution as a possible but not necessary
response to a problem, as one contingent solution amongst several possibilities. As
a consequence, the speciﬁcity of a system in the presence of (certain) universal
problems lies in its decision for one against all other (functionally equivalent)
93 eg Hein Kötz, Trust und Treuhand (); Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei, ‘The Functions of
Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis’, ()  New York University LR –.
94 Arthur T. von Mehren, ‘Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative
Analysis’, ()  Harvard LR –; Zweigert and Kötz (n ), ch —‘Indicia of Seriousness’;
Basil S. Markesinis, ‘Cause and Consideration: A Study in Parallel’, ()  Cambridge LJ –;
Ferdinand Fromholzer, Consideration ().
95 See Zweigert,  Israel LR  f; Konrad Zweigert and Hans-Jürgen Puttfarken, ‘Possibilities of
Comparing Analogous Institutions of Law in Diﬀerent Social Systems’, ()  Acta Juridica
Academiae Scientiarium Hungaricae –, German translation in idem (n ), –; Szabó (n ).
96 But see now Kirsten Scheiwe, ‘Was ist ein funktionales Äquivalent in der Rechtsvergleichung?
Eine Diskussion an Hand von Beispielen aus dem Familien- und Sozialrecht’, ()  Kritische
Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft –.
97 Merton (n ), –.
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solutions.98 Legal developments are thus no longer necessary but only possible, not
predetermined but contingent.99 This method in turn requires an understanding of
society (and its subsystems, including law) as a system constituted by the relation
of its elements, rather than set up by elements that are independent of each
other.100 It does not avoid the criticism of tautology—institutions are still under-
stood with regard to problems, and problems are understood as such by their
relation to institutions. But because Luhmann’s functionalism is constructivist, he
can use these tautologies as the means by which societies constitute themselves, by
which they make sense of institutions.
Although Luhmann emphasizes that ‘the functional method is ultimately a
comparative one’101 and occasionally suggests the comparison of systems as a valu-
able project of veriﬁcation,102 he does not, apart from a passing reference to Josef
Esser,103 use this for comparative law. Functionalist comparative law in turn has
rarely reacted to Luhmann’s method,104 despite the similar focus on functional
equivalence.105 This is unfortunate. Of course, Luhmann’s systems theory has been
criticized severely—as being indiﬀerent to individuals, inherently conservative
(again), and as ignorant of the permeability of systems. Yet all these criticisms can
also be launched against functionalist comparative law as it stands; they are not
reasons against enriching current functionalism with Luhmann’s constructivism.
98 Niklas Luhmann, ‘Funktion und Kausalität’, ()  Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und
Sozialpsychologie –; reprinted in Soziologische Aufklärung (vol I, th edn, ), –. For the
parallel concept of equiﬁnality, see Ludwig von Bertalanﬀy, ‘Der Organismus als physikalisches
System betrachtet’, ()  Naturwissenschaften ; idem, ‘General Systems Theory’, in idem, Main
Currents of Modern Thought (), , ; reprinted in Demerath and Peterson (n ), ,  ﬀ.
99 cf Gunther Teubner, Recht als autopoietisches System (),  f against Gordon’s criticism of
functionalism (n ).
100 ‘Niklas Luhmann, ‘Funktionale Methode und Systemtheorie’; ()  Soziale Welt –;
reprinted in idem (n ), –; idem, Soziale Systeme (), especially at  ﬀ; English translation
under the title of Social Systems by John Bednarz and Dirk Baecker (),  ﬀ; cf Stefan Jensen,
‘Funktionalismus und Systemtheorie—von Parsons zu Luhmann’, in Jetzkowitz and Stark (n ),
–.
101 See eg Luhmann, Soziale Systeme,  = Social Systems,  (both n ); cf idem, ‘Funktionale
Methode und Systemtheorie’ (n ),  ﬀ; idem, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (vol II, ),  f.
102 See eg Luhmann (n ),  f.
103 Luhmann, ‘Funktionale Methode und systemtheorie’ (n ),  n ; see also idem, Das Recht der
Gesellschaft (),  f,  f; English translation under the title of Law as a Social System by Klaus A.
Ziegert (),  f, .
104 A notable exception is Volkmar Gessner, ‘Soziologische Überlegungen zu einer Theorie der
angewandten Rechtsvergleichung’, ()  RabelsZ –, especially at  ﬀ; reprinted in Ulrich
Drobnig and Manfred Rehbinder (eds), Rechtssoziologie und Rechtsvergleichung (), –.
105 On systems theory and autopoiesis in comparative law, see eg Lynn M. LoPucki and George G.
Triantis, ‘A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Dis-
tressed Companies’, () Harvard International LJ ,  ﬀ; Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants:
Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying the Law Ends Up in New Divergences’, ()  Modern
LR  ﬀ; Mark van Hoecke, ‘Legal Orders between Autonomy and Intertwinement’, in Karl-Heinz Ladeur
(ed), Public Governance in the Age of Globalization (), –; Catherine Valcke, ‘Comparative
Law as Comparative Jurisprudence: The Comparability of Legal Systems’, ()  AJCL –.
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. Functionalist Comparative Law: Synthesis or Eclecticism?
Which of these concepts underlies the functional method of comparative law? The
answer is: all of the above. Comparative lawyers pick and choose diﬀerent concepts,
regardless of their incompatibility.106 There is still a strong faith that the similarities
between diﬀerent legal orders revealed by the functional method are neither the
result of circular reasoning, nor mere evidence of similar needs between societies,
but proof of deeper universal values. While this suggests an Aristotelian back-
ground, elsewhere functionalists place themselves outside of legal philosophy and
within legal sociology and emphasize objective needs over contingent values. In the
concept of function itself, comparative lawyers borrow, if inadvertently, the anti-
metaphysical focus of epistemological functionalism as opposed to an essential
concept of legal institutions; they understand institutions through their relation to
problems. But it is not clear whether this concept of function is teleological or not.
Sometimes comparatists use functions in an openly teleological fashion, as a way
towards progress reminiscent of adaptionism—when only legal systems at similar
stages of evolution are deemed comparable,107 or when the development of the law
is deemed important for the discovery of its function,108 a combination of cause
and function that is anathema to Durkheim’s postulates. Sometimes comparatists
focus on legal institutions as tools for the preservation of stability, something more
akin to classical functionalism. But then it is often unclear whether they include
latent functions in their focus on what laws do in eﬀect, or whether they conﬁne
themselves to manifest functions, as in instrumentalism and social engineering.
And ﬁnally, the claim that ‘there will always remain . . . an area where only sound
judgment, common sense, or even intuition can be of any help’109 has an irrational
ring to it that would, it seems, altogether distance functional comparative law from
the scientiﬁc aspirations of functionalism in all other disciplines.110
In particular, the functionalism of sociology and that of law are diﬀerent. First,
sociologists and lawyers use diﬀerent concepts of function.111 While sociological
106 See also Dimitra Kokkini-Iatridou, ‘Some Methodological Aspects of Comparative Law. The
Third Part of a (Pre-)paradigm’, ()  Netherlands International LR ,  ﬀ.
107 Zweigert and Kötz (n ),  (referring to Lambert).
108 Zweigert and Kötz (n ), : ‘. . . if the comparatist is to make sense of the rules and the problems
they are intended to solve he must often investigate their history’.
109 Zweigert and Kötz (n ), ; see also  (‘feeling’),  (‘imagination’).
110 But see, for the possible need of irrationality for comparison, Luhmann, Soziale Systeme,
 f = Social Systems,  f (both n ) and his cite to Alfred Baeumler, Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der
Ästhetik und Logik des . Jahrhunderts bis zur Kritik der Urteilskraft (, reprinted ),  ﬀ.
111 Niklas Luhmann, ‘Funktionale Methode und juristische Entscheidung’, ()  Archiv für
öﬀentliches Recht –; reprinted in idem, Ausdiﬀerenzierung des Rechts (paperback edn, ), –;
Hans – Joachim Bartels, Methode und Gegenstand intersystemarer Rechtsvergleichung (), –; cf
also Jean Carbonnier, ‘L’apport du droit comparé à la sociologie juridique’, in Livre du Centenaire
(n ), , –; Jerome Hall, Comparative Law and Social Theory (), ; Zweigert and Kötz (n ),
 f N.A. Florijn, Leidraad Voor Zinvolle rechtsveigelijking (), .
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functionalism is interested in latent functions (and largely ignores the intention
of lawmakers), lawyers focus precisely on manifest or even imagined as opposed
to latent functions: The judge must interpret a statute according to the function
intended by the legislator even if the statute is dysfunctional; the legislator can
consider only manifest functions because by deﬁnition he does not know about
latent functions.112 Sociologists could be said to take an external, and lawyers an
internal point of view.113 Second, the goals of functionalism in sociology and law are
diﬀerent. This is only partly due to the diﬀerence between normative and descriptive
analytical goals—after all, a large part of the judge’s task is descriptive, too.114 Rather,
sociologists use functionalism in order to raise complexity, so their picture of
observed societal systems becomes more accurate than a mere listing of its elements.
Lawyers, on the other hand, use functionalism to reduce complexity—they hope for
functionality to tell them which of several alternative decisions they should take.115
The eﬀects of judicial decisions are only partly the responsibility of judges;116 even
legislators must take decisions in necessary partial ignorance of eﬀects. Finally,
sociologists and legal philosophers often focus on the diﬀerentiated functions of
relatively broadly deﬁned institutions, while comparative lawyers take the existence
and functionality of law for granted and focus on very speciﬁc legal issues.
The clash between sociological and legal concepts of comparative law is some-
times observable—when Roscoe Pound’s sociological comparative law is criticized
from the Durkheimian tradition as unsociological,117 when a lawyer rejects a ques-
tionnaire proposal by a sociologist as too unspeciﬁc and too oblivious of legal
categories,118 or when Zweigert’s concept of functional comparative law is criti-
cized by lawyers as not suﬃciently legal and by sociologists as not suﬃciently
sociological.119 Whereas sociological functionalism has been criticized as inher-
ently conservative, legal functionalism and social engineering have been rejected
as overly progressive and activist. Whereas sociological functionalism is rejected as
tautological, legal functionalism is criticized for its open introduction of new
values into legal arguments. A big interdisciplinary project at the Hamburg
112 Of course, lawmakers may learn about latent functions over time. Sunset clauses for legislation
are a response to the problem: lawmakers make laws, then observe their latent functions and dysfunc-
tions, and then react to this learning experience.
113 William M. Evan, Angelo Grisoli, and Renato Treves, ‘Socialogia del divitto e divitto compa-
rato—Considerazione conclusive’, () Quaderni di sociologia ,  (quote by Traves); German
translation in Drobnig and Rehbinder (n ), , .
114 See Ralf Michaels and Nils Jansen, ‘Die Auslegung und Fortbildung ausländischen Rechts’,
()  Zeitschrift für Zivilprozeß , –.
115 Luhmann (n ), , ; cf Gessner, ()  RabelsZ  f.
116 See Gunther Teubner (ed), Entscheidungsfolgen als Rechtsgründe: Folgenorientiertes Argumentieren
in rechtsvergleichender Sicht ().
117 Lepaulle,  Harvard LR –. 118 Evan et al (n ).
119 Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, ‘Einige Bemerkungen über die Beziehung zwischen Rechtssozio-
logie und Rechtsvergleichung’, ()  Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft –; Gessner,
 RabelsZ ,  ﬀ.
  
Max Planck Institute involving both sociologists and lawyers largely failed due to
these incompabilities; the interaction between sociology and comparative law has
focused more on empirical sociology than on theory.120
One reason for the methodological mishmash in comparative law is that the
founders of the functional method were more pragmatically than methodologic-
ally interested. In suggesting, almost in passing, that the function of institutions
has to stand at the centre of the comparative endeavour,121 Ernst Rabel did not
develop an elaborate method from this insight. His approach was deliberately
pragmatic rather than theoretical; he was not interested in expansive method-
ological debate,122 but in solving practical problems. Ascribing a ‘functional
method’ to him was rather the work of his student Max Rheinstein, who intro-
duced his thoughts to the United States.123 Josef Esser came closer to developing an
elaborate functional method, but his inﬂuence did not extend to the details of the
method, and few would have shared his philosophical foundations. Konrad
Zweigert,124 despite the disdain for methodological debates uttered in his textbook,
published quite extensively on methodological questions. Yet he was driven
primarily by an interest in universalist humanism and in legal uniﬁcation; the
functional method was simply the best tool to reach these goals.
Methodological eclecticism could be justiﬁed as pragmatism. But it has invited
criticism, and functionalist comparatists react surprisingly defensively. One defen-
sive strategy is to acknowledge the relevance of culture as an add-on for functional-
ist comparative law. Yet with no clear view of the relationship between culture and
function, this must lead to an eclectic, internally inconsistent method. Another
strategy is to postulate a ‘methodological pluralism’ in which functionalism is only
one of several methods, and the comparatist picks (ad hoc ?) whichever method
seems most appropriate for a given purpose.125 Neither strategy seems promising
unless the strengths and weaknesses of a more clearly functional method are recog-
nized. If the functional method is deﬁcient, it is not clear why a moderated version
120 Michael Martinek, ‘Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Rechtsvergleichung und des Internationalen
Privatrechts in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, in Dieter Simon (ed), Rechtswissenschaft in der
Bonner Republik (), ,  f.
121 Rabel,  Rheinische Zeitschrift für Zivil- und Prozeßrecht ; also in Zweigert and Puttfarken
(n ), .
122 Max Rheinstein, ‘In Memory of Ernst Rabel’, ()  AJCL , ; cf Hans G. Leser, ‘Ein
Beitrag Ernst Rabels zur Privatrechtsmethode: “Die wohltätige Gewohnheit, den Rechtsfall vor der
Regel zu bedenken” ’, in Festschrift für Ernst von Caemmerer (), –; David J. Gerber, ‘Sculpt-
ing the Agenda of Comparative Law: Ernst Rabel and the Façade of Language’, in Annelise Riles (ed),
Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law (), ,  ﬀ.
123 Rheinstein,  University of Chicago LR –, especially at  f.
124 Rabel’s importance for Zweigert becomes clear in von Caemmerer, Zweigert (n ). Zweigert
wrote a short foreword for Esser’s book; see Esser (n ), VII.
125 See eg Jaakko Husa, ‘Farewell to Functionalism or Methodological Tolerance?’, () 
RabelsZ ,  f; Palmer,  AJCL ; see also A.E. Onderkerk, De preliminaire fase van het rechts-
vergelijkend onderzoek () ﬀ.
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should be maintained; if it is not deﬁcient, it is unclear why it should be moderated.
Yet we cannot evaluate this as long as we lack a coherently formulated functional
method, with a consistent concept of function.
III. Functions of Function
...................................................................................................................................................................
One could thus be excused for thinking functionalist comparative law indefensible.
The functional method has turned out to be an undertheorized approach with an
undeﬁned disciplinary position, assembling bits and pieces from various diﬀerent
traditions, which, while mutually incompatible, are similar in their decline. But to
think so would be hasty. If the substance of a functional method in comparative
law is unclear, our analysis should move from a substantive to a functional one and
focus on what it does, instead of what it is. In the spirit of Durkheim and Merton,
we should measure the method neither by its origins nor by the intentions of its
proponents, but by its functionality. We should look at the functions and dysfunc-
tions of the concept of function, including its latent functions, in the production
of comparative law knowledge. We should look at whether it is functional or
dysfunctional, and we should see whether alternative proposals could serve as
functional equivalents. This should enable us at the same time to start reconstruct-
ing the functional method as a constructive, interpretative,126 rather than positive
enterprise, as a way of making sense of legal systems—constructing them as mean-
ingful, instead of merely measuring them. Of course, such a method must use the
same concept of functionalism throughout. I propose to use equivalence func-
tionalism, both because it is the most robust concept in sociology and because it
represents the central element of functionalist comparative law as developed by
Rabel and Zweigert: functional equivalence.
This section focuses on seven functions: () the epistemological function of
understanding legal rules and institutions, () the comparative function of achiev-
ing comparability, () the presumptive function of emphasizing similarity, () the
formalizing function of system building, () the evaluative function of determining
the better law, () the universalizing function of preparing legal uniﬁcation, and
() the critical function of providing tools for the critique of law.
126 Otto Pfersmann, ‘Le droit comparé comme interpretation et comme théorie du droit’, ()
 RIDC –; see also Anne Peters and Heiner Schwenke, ‘Comparative Law beyond Post-
Modernism’, ()  ICLQ ,  f.
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. The Epistemological Function: Understanding Law
The ﬁrst function of function is epistemological. Functionalism provides a tool
to make sense of the data we ﬁnd. We understand this function of function
if we distinguish functionalist comparative law from an approach that shares
some of its methodology and is often referred to as functionalist: the factual
method,127 especially as applied in common core research.128 There are two import-
ant diﬀerences that strip the factual method of much of the explanatory power that
functionalism claims for itself and that suggest that the factual method and com-
mon core research should not be called functionalist.129 First, the factual method
shows us similarities across legal systems, but it does not tell us whether these are
accidental or necessary, or how they relate to society. Second, the factual method,
in focusing on cases, is limited in two ways: its problems are only disputes, and
its solutions are only court decisions. Functionalism promises more. It aims at
explaining the eﬀects of legal institutions as functions (a speciﬁc kind of relation),
and it promises to look at non-legal responses to societal requisites, too. The
functional method asks us to understand legal institutions not as doctrinal con-
structs but as societal responses to problems—not as isolated instances but in their
relation to the whole legal system, and beyond, to the whole of society.
This suggests why a frequent criticism of functionalism as being too rule-
centred130 may apply to much mainstream comparative law, but not to the func-
tional method. Functionalists explicitly ask that comparatists look not only at legal
rules (‘law in books’), nor only at the results of their application (‘law in action’),
but even beyond at non-legal answers to societal needs.131 Few comparatists may
practise this, but this is a ﬂaw in practice, not in the method. Similarly, the frequent
criticism that functionalism is reductive132 is unwarranted. The great advantage
of functionalism over substantivism, emphasized ﬁrst by Cassirer, is precisely
that it makes generalizations possible without loss of speciﬁcity.133 Functionalism
emphasizes relations in addition to institutions, and it focuses on latent in addition
to manifest functions. In this sense, a functionalist view of legal institutions, focus-
ing on the complex interrelatedness of societal elements, creates a picture not less
but more complex than that created by the participants in a legal system.134
127 eg Stefan Rozmaryn, ‘Etude comparative de cas administratifs concrets’, ()  RIDC –.
128 Rudolf Schlesinger (ed), Formation of Contracts: A Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems
(vol I, ), –.
129 cf Ralf Michaels, ‘Common Core?’, ERPL (forthcoming).
130 Frankenberg,  Harvard International LJ ; Graziadei (n ), ; Rosen (n ), ;
Constantinesco (n ), –: ‘Begriﬀsjurisprudenz’ (conceptual jurisprudence).
131 See eg Ascarelli (n ), , ; Zweigert and Kötz (n ),  f.
132 See eg Mark Tushnet, ‘The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law’, ()  Yale LJ
,  ﬀ.
133 Above pp  f. 134 Luhmann, Soziale Systeme,  = Social Systems  (both n ).
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The same is true for the criticism that functionalism makes no room for cul-
ture.135 Rightly understood, functionalist comparative law assumes that legal rules
are culturally embedded, especially once latent functions are accounted for. In fact,
functionalists can sound like their critics: ‘Le fait que tout droit est un phénomène
culturel et que les règles de droit ne peuvent jamais être considérées indépendam-
ment du contexte historique, social, économique, psychologique et politique est
conﬁrmé avec une force particulière par les enquêtes de droit comparé’;136 ‘cette
méthode fonctionnelle . . . permet d’atteindre . . . le système dans son homo-
généité, dans son esprit, dans ce qu  on a justement appelé sa “mentalité” . . .’.137
What distinguishes functionalists from culturalists is not the degree of attention to
culture, but the kind of attention. What critics call acultural is the functionalists’
resistance to adopting an insider’s view, their unwillingness to limit themselves to
culture as such, and of course their reconstruction of culture as functional (or
dysfunctional) relations. This can of course account for only one aspect of culture.
But once the futile hope to grasp any holistic ‘essence’ of culture is given up, a
functionalist outsider’s account need not be inferior to a culturalist insider’s
account; it just highlights a diﬀerent perspective. To do so, functionalism must
assume that ‘law’ can somehow be separated from ‘society’ because otherwise law
could not fulﬁl a function for society. This assumption of separability has been
criticized,138 but it can be defended at least as a heuristic device. The separation is
more in tune with both the use of the term ‘law’ and the functional diﬀerentiation
of modern societies; it carries more analytical force than collapsing all law into
society and culture would.
Obviously, functionalism is not the only available epistemological scheme for
understanding a legal system.139 Functionalists take an observer’s perspective as an
alternative to, not a substitute for, the participant’s perspective inherent in cultural
approaches, and emphasize the view of law in a speciﬁc (namely functional) rela-
tion, while ignoring other relations. Functionalism can thus not claim to capture
some essence or ‘ultimate truth’ of legal institutions;140 but such a claim would run
counter to its own programme, anyway. Functionalism in sociology as in philo-
sophy is the fruit of a move away from metaphysical concepts like ‘substance’ and
‘essence’; function is not an ontological category. Such a functionalist comparative
law, driven by a particular interest of the comparatist, cannot be fully objective and
135 Above, n .
136 Zweigert,  RIDC (n ),  f. 137 Ancel, ‘Problème’ (n ), .
138 cf Frankenberg,  Harvard International LJ ; Gordon,  Stanford LR  ﬀ; Geoﬀrey
Samuel, ‘Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sciences and Social Sciences’,
in Mark van Hoecke (ed), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (), ,  ﬀ.
139 Geoﬀrey Samuel, Epistemology and Method in Law (),  ﬀ.
140 Graziadei (n ), .
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neutral in the way traditional sciences aim at objectivity and neutrality,141 but this is
not a shortcoming.
If functions are relations between institutions and problems, then the ﬁrst task is
to ﬁnd the problem to be solved by legal institutions. And this is itself a problem.142
For evolutionists, a problem is a situation in society that spurs legal and ultimately
social change; the solution is only a temporary step forward that will lead to new
problems. For neo-Kantians, a problem is a legal problem (‘Rechtsproblem’) and
thus a problem deﬁned by the law and not by social reality, an aprioristic philo-
sophical concept.143 A solution cannot be found in an analogy to the sciences
because it requires a value judgment.144 For functionalists, ﬁnally, a problem is only
one side of a bipolar functional relation, the other side taken by the institution that
meets the need, so society can stay in equilibrium: problems and institutions
mutually constitute each other.
There are real issues with functionalism as a social science or as philosophy, but
less so for constructivist functionalism in comparative law. Explaining legal institu-
tions functionally drives hypotheses that consider the problems and the structure
of a society not as realities (either empirical or philosophical), but rather make
proposals about how societies can and should be understood, not just how they
work. That a problem exists and that an institution is a response to it need not
be proven; but the connection between events and institutions must be made
plausible as a way of understanding. We may well say that problems are con-
structed145 and still maintain explanatory power; we may analyse from a particular
non-universal viewpoint and oﬀer this analysis as one of several possible interpret-
ations. Functionalism thereby turns from a scientiﬁc to a constructive approach to
law, a way of ‘making sense’ that is distinct from the participants’ way of making
sense of their legal systems. This would be problematic for a positive science. It
is not so for an argumentative and normative, purpose-oriented discipline like
comparative law.
141 Frankenberg,  Harvard International LJ ; Mark van Hoecke and Mark Warrington, ‘Legal
Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law’, ()
 ICLQ , ; Husa,  RabelsZ .
142 Gessner,  RabelsZ  ﬀ; Hans F. Zacher, ‘Vorfragen zu den Methoden der Sozialrechts-
vergleichung’, in idem (ed), Methodische Probleme des Sozialrechtsvergleichs (), ,  ﬀ; Hill, 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies ; Onderkerk (n )  ﬀ; Teemu Ruskola, ‘Legal Orientalism’, ()
 Michigan LR ,  f. See already Ernst von Hippel, Book Review of Salomon (n ), () 
Archiv des öﬀentlichen Rechts ,  f.
143 See Arwed Blomeyer, ‘Zur Frage der Abgrenzung von vergleichender Rechtswissenschaft und
Rechtsphilosophie’, ()  RabelsZ , especially at  f.
144 Salomon (n ),  ﬀ.
145 Luhmann, Soziale Systeme  = Social Systems  (both n ); Florijn (n ) ; Nils Jansen,
‘Dogmatik, Erkenntnis und Theorie im europäischen Privatrecht’, ()  Zeitschrift für Europäis-
ches Privatrecht , .
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. The Comparative Function: Tertium Comparationis
Of course, this interpretative reconstruction of functionalism immediately raises
the question why one functional explanation should be more plausible than
another. How can functions be tested empirically? How can we prove values?
Comparison can help here, and this leads to the second function of function—that
of tertium comparationis.
Comparison traditionally requires an invariant element. In theory, a functional
method could set either problems or institutions as invariant;146 in reality, as long
as institutions are non-universal, only problems can play the role of a constant.
Functionalists often claim that comparative law can serve as the closest substitute
for an experiment to test a hypothesis on functional relations.147 Yet this still begs
the question whether needs and problems are universal.148 It is not even clear what
universality of problems means: Philosophers like Max Salomon understand these
problems as philosophically universal problems of general jurisprudence, while the
sociological strand understands them as empirically universal problems of soci-
eties. As a consequence, it is not clear whether function as tertium comparationis
refers to (manifest) value judgments by legislatures or to (latent) sociological needs
or, as Rabel said somewhat opaquely, to both.149 In addition, sociologists and
anthropologists who deﬁne substantive problems often fall into one of two traps.150
Either their lists of societal needs151 are too abstract for meaningful comparative
law—the stability of society is relevant on a diﬀerent level than the enforcement of
146 Luhmann (n ), ; Scheiwe,  Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswis-
senschaft  n .
147 Lepaulle,  Harvard LR  f; reprinted in Zweigert and Puttfarken (n ),  f (‘recoupement’);
Roscoe Pound, ‘Some Thoughts about Comparative Law’, in Festschrift für Ernst Rabel () ,  f;
similarly Merton (n ), .
148 Watson (n ),  f; Jerome Hall (n ), –; Constantinesco  ﬀ; Wolfgang Mincke, ‘Eine
vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft’, ()  Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft , ;
Richard Hyland, ‘Comparative Law’, in Dennis Patterson (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and
Legal Theory (), , ; de Cruz (n ), –; James Q. Whitman, ‘The Neo-Romantic turn’, in
Legrand and Munday (n ), , .
149 Ernst Rabel, ‘El fomento internacional del derecho privado’, ()  Revista de derecho
privado , ; reprinted in Gesammelte Aufsätze (n , vol III) , : ‘el tertium comparationis,
constituido de un lado por las intenciones sociales económicas y éticas de las leyes, y de otro por las
exigencias practicas de la vida que se presentan como parecidas entre sí’ (the tertium comparationis,
constituted on the one hand by the law’s social, economic, and ethical purposes, on the other hand by the
practical exigencies of life as they similarly present themselves). See also idem, ‘In der Schule von
Ludwig Mitteis’, () – Journal of Juristic Papyrology , ; reprinted in Gesammelte Aufsätze
(n , vol III) , : ‘die funktionelle Betrachtung—die man auch die soziale, aber am wichtigsten
die juristische nennen konnte . . .’ (the functional analysis—which could also be called social, but
most importantly juristic..).
150 Tushnet,  Yale LJ .
151 eg D. F. Aberle, A. K. Cohen, A. K. Davis, M. J. Levy, Jr, and F. X. Sutton, ‘The Functional
Prerequisites of a Society’, ()  Ethics –; reprinted in Demerath and Peterson (n ), –;
cf Marion Levy, The Structure of Society (), –.
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consumer rights. Or problems are contingent on speciﬁc societal structures and
thus no longer universal152—the problem of protecting shareholder rights will not
exist in societies without capital markets. For example, we may think that societies
require deterrence of wrongdoing and that tort law is there to fulﬁl this need. But
how do we know that this is the problem that tort law solves? Why is its function
not compensation, instead, or the eﬀectuation of certain societal values? Or is tort
law perhaps even dysfunctional?153
Some comparatists try to avoid these challenges by restricting the analysis to
societies at similar stages of development and in certain relatively value-neutral
areas of the law.154 Yet not only have such more complex comparisons been made
frequently.155 Also, the restriction to societies at the same stage of development
smacks of the now-discarded functional adaptionism; and the restriction to value-
neutral areas of the law assumes the similarity of problems precisely by designating
areas of the law as value-free and therefore non-contingent.
It seems more fruitful to diﬀerentiate between levels of analysis. We can assume
relatively safely that certain abstract problems—for example, the need to survive—
are universal, at least in the sense that all societies face them qua being societies.156
Such general problems cannot simply be broken down into the speciﬁc problems
that interest comparative lawyers by mere deduction, just as discussions about the
function of law in general do not yield answers addressing the functions of speciﬁc
legal institutions. Many problems are contingent on the solutions to other prob-
lems.157 But they enable the comparatist who does not ﬁnd universality of a certain
problem at a high degree of speciﬁcity to step down one level because derived
needs arise, if in a contingent way, from original needs. The more speciﬁc a prob-
lem is, the less likely its universality, but a focus on the more general level enables
us to see not only the contingency of certain problems but also what the analogous
problems in other legal systems are. This leads to a much more complex, but also a
richer, functional analysis.
Furthermore, functionalist epistemology makes it unnecessary to assume uni-
versal problems. Once the formulation of a problem is understood as a construct-
ive move rather than an empirical one, the universality of problems is likewise a
constructive move rather than a mere representation of reality. Comparability is
152 Goldschmidt (n ),  ﬀ.
153 Nils Jansen, Binnenmarkt, Privatrecht und europäische Identität (),  ﬀ. For another
example, see Iain D.C. Ramsay, ‘Functionalism and Political Economy in the Comparative Study of
Consumer Insolvency: An unﬁnished story from England and Wales’ ()  Theoretical Inquiries
in Law ,  ﬀ.
154 See eg Zweigert (n ), .
155 See the examples given by Graziadei (n ),  f; cf also the criticism by Frankenberg, 
Harvard International LJ  f; Constantinesco (n ), n .
156 Wilbert E. Moore and Joyce Sterling, ‘The Comparison of Legal Systems: A Critique’, ()
 Quaderni ﬁorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico , ; cf Goldschmidt (n ),  ﬀ.
157 Goldschmidt (n ),  ﬀ.
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attained through the construction of universal problems as tertia comparationis.
This is where the notion of functional equivalent has its bite. Even if legal institu-
tions are understood as responses to societal needs, they are not caused by these
needs in the sense of logical necessity. Rather. They are contingent responses to
these needs that can be identiﬁed with reference to the other possible responses,
the functional equivalents, that were not chosen.158 These functional equivalents
may not be known until they appear in other legal systems, but their appearance
enables the comparatist to construct the underlying problem and thereby to recog-
nize the functions of a legal institution. The similarity of results to certain fact
situations, regardless of diﬀerences in doctrine, strongly suggests that the respective
legal institutions can be seen as diﬀerent (but functionally equivalent) responses to
a similar problem. This reasoning is of course circular—it goes from problems to
functions and from functions to problems. But this circularity resembles the way in
which mathematicians recognize functions, and it appears justiﬁed for constructiv-
ist comparative law as interpretation because it mirrors the hermeneutic circle
between the comparatist and the legal systems observed that is characteristic of
comparative law.159
. The Presumptive Function: Praesumptio Similitudinis
The universality of problems leads to the question of diﬀerence and similarity.
Zweigert suggested the (in)famous praesumptio similitudinis, a presumption of
similarity: The comparatist should assume that diﬀerent societies face similar
needs and that, to survive, any one society must have (functionally equivalent)
institutions that meet these needs. As a consequence, if the comparatist ﬁnds no
functional equivalent in a foreign legal order, he should ‘check again whether the
terms in which he posed his original question were indeed purely functional, and
whether he has spread the net of his researches quite wide enough’.160
Perhaps no statement in the history of comparative law has been criticized
more than this short passage. Three types of  this criticism deserve attention
here. First, the postulate violates requirements of scientiﬁc method: Following
Popper’s critical rationalism, the comparatist should try not to prove but to
falsify hypotheses.161 Second, the postulate violates requirements of ideological
neutrality, or requirements of the correct ideology: The comparatist should not
favour similarity over diﬀerence, but should either be objective and neutral as
between similarity and diﬀerence or should even openly advocate diﬀerence over
158 See above, pp  f. 159 cf Zacher (n ),  f; Ruskola,  Michigan LR  f.
160 Zweigert and Kötz (n ), ; for an earlier version see already Zweigert, ‘Praesumptio
Similitudinis’ (n )  f. Zweigert ﬁrst mentioned the praesumptio in ‘Méthodologie’ (n ),  =
‘Zur Methode’ (n ), .
161 von Benda-Beckmann, ()  Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft .
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similarity.162 Third, the postulate is reductionist: Similarity will only appear once
legal orders or institutions are stripped of culturally relevant and contingent
details.163 Some defendants of functionalism yield to the critique; they are ready to
give the presumption up.164 But things are not that easy.
First, the presumption of similarity must be placed in its historical context. It
was formulated after a war had been fought on the allegation of insurmountable
diﬀerences; this is one reason why comparatists tried to counter the presumption
of diﬀerence prevailing among ordinary lawyers of that time.165 In this sense, the
presumption of similarity was as critical of the state of aﬀairs of its time as is
the current emphasis on diﬀerence, which may likewise be just a rhetorical strat-
egy.166 Calls for ‘falsiﬁcation’ of the presumption are, then, as misplaced as calls
for a switch to a praesumptio dissimilitudinis because they only shift the relation
between rule and exception.167
More to the point, the presumption is closely linked to the methodological
assumptions. If only functionally equivalent institutions are comparable, then by
deﬁnition these institutions must be similar in the sense that they respond to the
same problem. To this extent, the presumption is not just Zweigert’s naïve idea, but
a necessary element of functionalist comparative law. Here the caveat that only
societies at similar stages and institutions in value-neutral areas of the law can be
compared becomes important. Of course, this caveat turns the assumption into a
tautology: problems are universal in so far as we exclude all problems that are not
universal.168 But this tautology is not fatal once we understand functionalism as a
constructive method: it describes the thought process between the general and the
speciﬁc, between presumed problems and institutions as presumed responses, that
creates legal knowledge. The claim of universality of a problem is a ﬁrst interpret-
ative step that can be challenged, but this is a fruitful way of making sense of one
legal system in relation to another.
If therefore the presumption of similarity is central to the functional method, it
162 Curran,  AJCL ; Pierre Legrand, Le droit comparé (), : ‘principium individuationis’;
Hyland (n ), : ‘coniectura dissimilitudinis’.
163 Geertz, ‘Local Knowledge’ (n ); Volkmar Gessner, ‘Praesumptio similitudinis?—A Critique of
Comparative Law’, in  Annual Meeting of the ISA Research Committee on Sociology of Law ‘Legal
Culture: Encounters and Transformations’, Section Meetings, August –,  (), , : ‘the prae-
sumptio similitudinis is nothing but a consequence of poor data collection in comparative legal
studies’; see already idem,  RabelsZ .
164 See eg Ancel, Utilité (n ),  ﬀ; de Cruz (n ), ; Husa,  RabelsZ  f,  f; cf Hein Kötz, ‘The
Common Core of European Private Law: Presented at the Third General Meeting of the Trento Project’,
()  Hastings International and Comparative LR , , slightly revised from ()  ERPL ,
: ‘must be rebutted when there is evidence for doing so’; see also Ruskola,  Michigan LR .
165 Curran,  AJCL  ﬀ. 166 Thus Legrand (n ), ; see also Husa,  RabelsZ  f.
167 cf Nathaniel Berman, ‘Aftershocks: Exoticization, Normalization and the Hermeneutic Com-
pulsion’, () Utah LR –.
168 Hiram Chodosh, ‘Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology’, ()  Iowa LR
,  f.
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becomes vital to understand clearly what the presumption does and does not say.
What is presumed to be similar are neither the legal institutions, nor the problems
to be solved by them and the need for societies to respond to them, but the
functional relation between problems and solutions: if a society has a certain
problem a, it must have a legal institution y, and diﬀerent solutions to a are
functionally equivalent. This does not mean that diﬀerent solutions to similar
problems, the core element of the functional method, are really ‘similar’; Zweigert’s
own formulation of ‘similarity’ is misleading. Tort law and insurance law are not
similar just because they fulﬁl the same function of providing accident victims
with compensation for their accidents. They are obviously diﬀerent—not only in
their doctrinal structures but also (a point often neglected by comparatists) in their
eﬀects and functions (or dysfunctions) regarding problems other than that of
compensation, such as deterrence, the creation of certain kinds of jobs (judges or
insurers), litigiousness, or a welfare mentality. They are similar regarding only one
element—namely, the solution of one speciﬁc problem. This is not similarity. This
is functional equivalence.169
Some critics consider the praesumptio similitudinis to be internally inconsistent,
because comparatists claim that diﬀerent legal systems ﬁnd similar results although
at the same time they advocate diﬀerences between the legal institutions they
compare.170 They are partly right. Comparatists do indeed look at diﬀerence and
similarity at the same time, but that is not inconsistency. Rather, functional equiva-
lence is similarity in diﬀerence; it is ﬁnding that institutions are similar in one
regard (namely in one of the functions they fulﬁl) while they are (or at least may
be) diﬀerent in all other regards—not only in their doctrinal formulations, but
also in the other functions or dysfunctions they may have besides the one on which
the comparatist focuses. The decision to look at a certain problem, and thus at a
certain function, therefore becomes crucial for ﬁnding similarity. But this is always
similarity regarding only that one function. The ﬁnding of similarity is contingent
on the comparatist’s focus.
It follows that this degree of similarity cannot explain a whole institution.
First, by choosing one institution β1 a society decides against other possible func-
tionally equivalent institutions β2 and β3. The choice of tort law for compensation
purposes is, at least in part, a choice against insurance law for the same purposes. It
would therefore be wrong to say that ‘really’ tort law and insurance are the same,
because this would strip the decision for one and against the other institution of
its relevance. Second, when the comparatist uses one function as his tertium
comparationis, he deliberately leaves other functions out of his view for which
169 cf Scheiwe,  Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft ; Hein
Kötz, ‘Abschied von der Rechtskreislehre?’, ()  Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht ,  f.
170 Hill,  Oxford Journal of Legal Studies , ; cf Frankenberg,  Harvard International LJ .
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institutions may well be diﬀerent.171 In so far as functional equivalence means
similarity regarding one function, the presumption is tautological:172 because only
institutions fulﬁlling the same function are comparable, by deﬁnition they must be
similar regarding their quality of fulﬁlling this function. Nothing is said about any
further similarity or diﬀerence. Because critics have spilled much ink on a mis-
understanding, this insight deserves repeating: Functionalism leads to compar-
ability of institutions that can thereby maintain their diﬀerence even in the
comparison. It neither presumes, nor does it lead to, similarity.
. The Systematizing Function: Building a System
As a last step in the comparative method, Zweigert proposes the ‘building of
a system’ with its own ‘special syntax and vocabulary’.173 How is it possible to do
so, given that ‘comparative law is by its nature a functional and antidoctrinal
method’?174 Must such a system not necessarily be as formalist and as doctrinal as
the national systems that the functional methods try to overcome?175
In one way the answer is yes: scientiﬁc approaches aim at building systems, and
systems are by their nature formalist. We see this development in social anthropo-
logists who hoped that function would lead to a general heuristics of societies and
societal systems; in sociologists like Parsons who developed his elaborate AGIL
system;176 and in legal philosophers who linked comparative law to the system-
building project of general jurisprudence. All these system-building projects have
been criticized as being insensitive to details and as technocratic.
171 Luhmann (n ), : ‘Einzelne funktionale Leistungen sind nur in einer bestimmten ana-
lytischen Perspektive äquivalent’ (individual functional achievements are equivalent only from
a speciﬁc analytical perspective); Scheiwe,  Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und
Rechtswissenschaft  f.
172 For this criticism, see Scheiwe,  Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswis-
senschaft , .
173 Zweigert and Kötz (n ), –; Max Rheinstein, ‘Teaching Comparative Law’, (–) 
University of Chicago LR ,  f. For problems of systematization and terminology in a practical
example of functionalist comparative law, see Ulrich Drobnig, ‘Methodenfragen der Rechtsverglei-
chung im Lichte der “International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law” ’, in Ius Privatum Gentium—
Festschrift für Max Rheinstein (), , –. The prominent position of the system in Zweigert
and Kötz’s treatise may be due to Zweigert’s interest in a system of comparative law before he
advocated functionalism. See eg Konrad Zweigert, Book Review, ()  RabelsZ –; Bernhard C.
H. Aubin and Konrad Zweigert, Rechtsvergleichung im deutschen Hochschulunterricht (), eg at 
(‘Einheit eines überpositiven Systems’, unity of a suprapositive system).
174 Konrad Zweigert, ‘Rechtsvergleichung, System und Dogmatik’, in Festschrift für Eduard
Bötticher (), , .
175 For criticism, see Ernst Kramer,  RabelsZ –, against Esser and Rothoeft. Riles,  Harvard
International LJ  f, posits that the postmodern attack against modernist comparative law parallels
the modernist attack against earlier comparative law.
176 Adaptation, Goal attainment, Integration, Latency.
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Comparative lawyers may ﬁrst respond that they do what functionalist lawyers
like Philipp Heck did: if rules and systems cannot be discarded altogether, they
should at least be improved. For example, comparison reveals that ownership is
transferred by mere consent in some legal systems, while others require the passing
of possession, but the answers to speciﬁc fact situations are remarkably similar.
These results can be formalized in three easy rules: Between transferor and trans-
feree ownership passes through mere consent; with regard to third parties owner-
ship passes through transfer of possession; third parties with notice must accept
the transfer of ownership between transferor and transferee under the ﬁrst rule.177
The ensuing system is still doctrinal and thus open to external criticism, but at least
it describes the state of the diﬀerent legal systems better than their own rules.
Of course this leaves the more fundamental criticism against any kind of system-
building at large. This criticism cannot be avoided, because system-building is
inherently linked with equivalence functionalism.178 Three kinds of relations are
indispensable for functional comparison: the similarity relation between the prob-
lems in diﬀerent societies, the functional relation between each individual problem
and the legal institution with which a given legal system responds to it, and the
equivalence relation between the institutions in diﬀerent legal systems. The question
phrased by functionalist comparison therefore already entails a system; Zweigert’s
system-building only formalizes it. It would be a mistake to consider this func-
tional system as somehow more real than the doctrinal legal systems from which
it is derived, if only because its formulation is necessarily formal, too. The system
created by equivalence functionalism is a construction, and as such it is open to
criticism like any other system. But it may be a better, more appropriate system
than others, it may provide new angles on the legal systems we compare, and it may
thereby help us both understand and critique those systems.
. The Evaluative Function: Determining the Better Law
While the construction of a system is thus an implicitly normative-critical project,
functionalist comparative law sometimes asserts an explicitly normative function:
Functionality should serve as a yardstick to determine the ‘better law’. This step
from facts to norms is always problematic in comparative law. Saleilles proposed
to look to the majority solution of legal orders to ﬁnd a ‘droit idéal relatif ’,179 but
177 Ralf Michaels, Sachzuordnung durch Kaufvertrag (), especially  ﬀ; cf already Fr. Vinding
Kruse, ‘What Does “Transfer of Property” Mean with Regard to Chattels? A Study in Comparative
Law’, ()  AJCL –; Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Diversity and Uniformity in the Law’, ()  AJCL ,
 f.
178 Luhmann, ‘Funktionale Methode und Systemtheorie’ (n ).
179 Saleilles (n ); idem, ‘École historique et droit naturel’, ()  Revue trimestrielle de droit civil
, , ,  ﬀ; Zweigert,  RabelsZ –.
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why should majority suggest superiority? The Common Core projects look to
commonalities among all legal orders, but even the fact of commonality (to the
extent it exists) does not have intrinsic normative force.180 Indeed, functional
comparatists often hesitate to move to such normative conclusions. Rabel, for
example, argued that evaluation was not strictly an element of comparative law.181
The neo-Kantians’ concept of ideal law is independent of existing legal orders.182
Both approaches thus face the same problem from diﬀerent sides. The sociologist
cannot deduce an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’; comparative material gives no guidelines;
even commonality has no independent normative force. The idealist philosopher
can develop his ideal law in the abstract; but it is not clear how the knowledge of
the diﬀerent legal orders can help him or why that knowledge is even relevant.
Zweigert himself was aware that the empirical material collected by the com-
paratist did not have legal authority183 and that the comparative lawyer, in order to
determine the better law, ‘must operate with assumptions which . . . would rightly
be derided by the sociologist of law as simple working hypotheses’.184 But he
thought that, whenever functionalist comparative law studies ﬁnd similarity in
result among diﬀerent legal orders, all that needs to be evaluated is the better
doctrinal formulation, and this is a task that the jurist is both able and entitled to
do.185 Others seem more ambitious.186
The unease is justiﬁed: equivalence functionalism provides surprisingly limited
tools for evaluation.187 The speciﬁc function itself cannot serve as a yardstick, for
functionally equivalent institutions are by deﬁnition of equal value with respect to
that function—equivalence means, literally, of equal value. Once a speciﬁc func-
tion has been used to determine relative similarity, the same function cannot
determine superiority, for this would require a relative diﬀerence. It is impossible
ﬁrst to isolate the function of a legal institution from its doctrinal formulation and
to measure this remaining functional element against some ideal function, for no
such ideal function exists beyond the mundane reality of the legal order. In this
strict sense, better-law theory is not compatible with functionalist comparative law.
180 Hill,  Oxford Journal of Legal Studies ; J. P. Verheul, ‘Così fan tutte’, in Comparability
and Evaluation: Essays on Comparative Law, Private International Law and International Commercial
Arbitration in Honour of Kokkini-Iatridou (), –.
181 Rabel,  Rheinische Zeitschrift für Zivil- und Prozeßrecht  (but see  ﬀ).
182 Radbruch, ‘Über die Methode’ (n ); Salomon (n ),  ﬀ; Blomeyer (n ), .
183 Zweigert,  RabelsZ  f; idem, ‘Die kritische Wertung in der Rechtsvergleichung’, in Law and
Trade: Recht und Internationaler Handel. Festschrift für Clive Schmitthoﬀ (), , .
184 Zweigert and Kötz (n ),  f; cf .
185 Zweigert, ‘Kritische Wertung’ (n ),  f; for a more explicit is/ought cross-over, see idem, 
RabelsZ .
186 Rheinstein,  University of Chicago LR,  f: ‘[E]very rule and institution has to justify its exist-
ence under two inquiries: First: What function does it serve in present society? Second: Does it serve this
function well or would another rule serve it better? It is obvious that the second question cannot be
answered except upon the basis of a comparison with other legal systems’ (internal footnote omitted).
187 cf Niklas Luhmann, Zweckbegriﬀ und Systemrationalität (), .
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This may explain why so many comparative studies list similarities and diﬀerences
and then run out of criteria to determine which of the laws is better.
If the yardstick must therefore lie outside the speciﬁc function under scrutiny,
it can be found either in the costs of an institution, or in its functionality or
dysfunctionality regarding other problems. This, however, makes a comprehensive
evaluation almost impossibly complex. Take, for example, the diﬀerent responses to
car accidents of the New Zealand insurance system and the English tort law system.
Arguably, New Zealand’s law is functionally superior to English law regarding the
function of compensation, because its transaction costs are lower. English law in
turn is arguably superior with regard to the function of deterrence, because it creates
better incentives for careful driving. Now, equivalence functionalism suggests that
New Zealand meets the latter function of deterrence with other institutions—
criminal liability, for example—so we have to account for this in our evaluation, too.
But criminal law is costly and perhaps dysfunctional in so far as it clutters court-
houses, so we must also take the costs of court procedures into account, and so forth.
Micro-comparison regarding individual functions turns into macro-comparison
between whole legal systems.
This example illustrates the crux of equivalence functionalism: its advantages in
achieving comparability turn into disadvantages for evaluation. The focus on func-
tional equivalence instead of similarity or diﬀerence is a deliberate way of mastering
complexity without reducing speciﬁcity: institutions are made comparable precisely
by reducing them to one function. To evaluate these institutions, however, it is not
enough to focus only on this one function, because institutions are multifunctional;
yet the focus on all other functions and dysfunctions reintroduces complexity.
This does not make an evaluation of the results of functionalist comparison
impossible, but it shows its limits.188 First, the criteria of evaluation must be
diﬀerent from the criteria of comparability. Ultimately, evaluation remains a policy
decision, a practical judgment, under conditions of partial uncertainty. The func-
tional method can show alternatives and provide some information and thereby
greatly improve this policy decision, but it cannot substitute for it. Second, any
evaluation of functionally equivalent solutions is valid only with regard to the
function scrutinized in the comparative inquiry—one law, one institution is not
better than the other tout court. At best it may be better regarding a certain
function. Thus, equivalence functionalism makes comparability possible, but
simultaneously suggests restraint in evaluating results.
A good example for the strengths and limits of functionalism for evaluation is the
House of Lords decision in White v Jones.189 The question was whether a solicitor
who had negligently failed to ﬁnalize a will was responsible to the intended bene-
ﬁciaries. The Court starts by assessing several functions of liability: Tort-feasors
188 Prudent functionalists admit this much, eg Rheinstein,  University of Chicago LR .
189 []  AC .
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should not go ‘scot-free’, solicitors should maintain a high standard, legacies play
an important role in society, etc. Then the Court compares various functionally
equivalent foreign doctrinal constructions that would support the solicitor’s liabil-
ity as to their adequacy within English law. However, while these foreign solutions
are comparable because they are responses to the same problem (functionalism),
the second step, assessing whether these solutions could be adopted in English
law, is a matter of doctrinal ﬁt within English law. Functionalism could play no role
in this.
. The Universalizing Function: Unifying Law
Evaluation is closely linked to another function connected with the functional
method since its early days: to be a tool for the uniﬁcation of law. Functionalist com-
paratists advocate their method as ideal for this purpose, whether regionally (eg in
Europe), or worldwide. Their argument rests on functionalism’s ability to identify
similarities among seemingly diﬀerent laws; it should enable lawmakers to write an
optimal uniform law that overcomes and transcends the doctrinal peculiarities of
local legal systems. Once the functional similarities of diﬀerent laws are realized, the
argument goes, it becomes easier to unify them on the basis of these similarities.
Two problems with this argument have been treated above: the functional
method alone cannot reveal the best legal system (Section III.), and as an antidoc-
trinal method it is not well equipped for the formulation of legal rules that must be
doctrinal (Section III.). Lawmakers cannot ignore lawyers’ actual experiences
with legal doctrine and the creation of systems if they want to create a new
doctrine and a new system.190 Functionalist comparative law works well for
critiquing doctrine, far less well for its establishment.
Yet there is an additional, slightly less obvious reason why functionalist com-
parative law is a particularly bad tool for the uniﬁcation of law. A teleological
version of functionalism may well contain a preference for convergence, some
elements of which appear in the work of both Rabel and Zweigert. Equivalence
functionalism, on the other hand, provides arguments against uniﬁcation. If diﬀer-
ent legal systems are already similar regarding individual functions, as the
functional method shows, then the beneﬁts from uniﬁcation lie only in formal
improvements191 and may well be outweighed by the costs.192 First, it is often
190 Christian Baldus, ‘Historische Rechtsvergleichung im zusammenwachsenden Europa: Funk-
tionelle Grenzen der funktionellen Methode?’, (/)  Zeitschrift für Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht
; cf Jansen (n ),  ﬀ.
191 See eg Ugo Mattei, ‘A Transaction Cost Approach to the European Code’, () ERPL , .
192 See eg Hein Kötz, ‘Rechtsvereinheitlichung: Nutzen, Kosten, Methoden, Ziele’, ()  RabelsZ
–; Christian Kirchner, ‘A “European Civil Code”: Potential, Conceptual, and Methodological
Implications’, ()  University of California Davis LR ,  ﬀ.
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ineﬃcient for lawyers to learn new formal rules if these fulﬁl the same functions as
the old ones; this is one important reason for practitioners’ continuing lack of
interest in the UN Sales Convention and for the reserved reactions of European
business to proposals for a uniﬁed European contract law.192a Second, the functional
method assumes that each legal institution performs a variety of functions within
its legal system and that there is a sensitive interaction among the various institu-
tions in each system that accounts for intersystemic diﬀerences. Uniﬁcation of
individual areas of the law is then likely to unsettle this balance. This can be
observed in the diﬃcult coordination between the United Nations Sales Conven-
tion (CISG) and national legal systems.193 The functional method with its emphasis
on functional equivalence shows why uniﬁcation may be easier than one might
think, but also why it is less important.
Of course, the last argument of interactions within a system can also provide an
argument in favour of uniﬁcation. That diﬀerent legal systems respond to similar
problems with diﬀerent needs leads to problems in choice of law if actors, willingly
or unwillingly, pick and choose solutions from diﬀerent legal orders that do not
combine into a whole. For example, one legal system may protect surviving
spouses through the law of succession, the other through family law; one legal
system protects poor parties through the law of damages, the other through the law
of procedure. This can lead to inconsistencies if, under a choice of law analysis,
diﬀerent laws are applicable for diﬀerent areas. Most of these problems, however,
can be countered through a functionalist approach to choice of law.194
It becomes evident, somewhat surprisingly, that the functional method is not
only a bad tool for legal uniﬁcation, but even provides powerful arguments for
maintaining diﬀerences. Indeed, modern law makers often prefer functional
equivalence to uniﬁcation. For example, in European Union law, directives must be
implemented not in their doctrinal structure but only with regard to their results;
the implementing laws in the member states are not similar but functionally
equivalent. Similarly, the principle of mutual recognition in European Union law
requires not similarity, but equivalence—presumably functional equivalence.195
The OECD Convention on Corruption requires its member states to use not
192a But see now Stefan Vogenauer and Stephen Weatherill, ‘The European Community’s Com-
petence to pursue the Harmonisation of Contract Law – An Empirical contribution to the Debate’, in
Vogenaur and Weatherill (eds), The Harmonisation of European Contract Law (), ,  ﬀ.
193 For use of functionalist comparative law here see Franco Ferrari, ‘The Interaction between the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and Domestic Remedies
(Rescission for Mistake and Remedies in Torts)’ (forthcoming )  RabelsZ Issue .
194 Below, pp  f.
195 cf the examples of education degrees and data protection in Scheiwe,  Kritische Viertel-
jahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft  f.
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similar, but functionally equivalent measures against corruption.196 So does inter-
national trade law: In the famous semi-conductors case, Europeans complained
that through monitoring Japanese corporations, the Japanese government was
eﬀectively preventing those companies from exporting below certain company-
speciﬁc costs. Japan countered that monitoring measures were not restrictions.
However, a GATT panel made clear that the formal character of a governmental
measure was irrelevant as long as it operated in a manner equivalent to mandatory
restrictions.197 In the Japanese legal culture, even formally non-binding measures
imposed by the government were considered and treated as binding. They were, in
other words, functionally equivalent.
. The Critical Function: Critique of Legal Orders
This leaves the last proclaimed function of functional analysis, its critical function
in various ways: tolerance of foreign law, critique of foreign law, critique of our
own law, and critique of law in general. Functionalism does not fare equally well
for all of these.
Functionalist comparative law can overcome a home bias against foreign law.198
This shows particularly well in the conﬂict of laws, in which the question of accept-
ing foreign law gains practical relevance, and functionalist comparison is often
applied.199 The most famous example for functionalism in the conﬂict of laws is
Rabel’s proposal to use functional comparison for the purpose of characteriza-
tion.200 Similarly, substitution and adaptation, the (somewhat idiosyncratic)
methods of aligning diﬀerent legal orders, require functional comparison. But the
most important use of functionalist comparisons and functional equivalence con-
cerns the question whether application of foreign law violates the forum’s public
policy. The German Bundesgerichtshof, holding that a foreign judgment on punitive
196 Gemma Aiolﬁ and Mark Pieth, ‘How to Make a Convention Work: the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development Recommendation and Convention on Bribery as an Example
of a New Horizon in International Law’, in Cyrille Fijnaut and Leo Huberts (eds), Corruption,
Integrity and Law Enforcement (), , –; Mireille Delmas-Marty, Le relatif et l’universel
(), –.
197 Japan: Trade in Semi-conductors, Report of the Panel adopted on  May , L/, Basic
Instruments and Selected Documents S/, especially nn , .
198 Martijn W. Hesselink, The New European Legal Culture () , .
199 For the usefulness of functionalist comparison for conﬂict of laws, see Arthur T. von Mehren,
‘An Academic Tradition for Comparative Law?’, ()  AJCL , .
200 Ernst Rabel, ‘Das Problem der Qualiﬁkation’, ()  RabelsZ –. Graziadei (n ),  ﬀ,
even posits that the roots of functional comparative law are in problems of characterization. Yet while
early texts on functionalism draw the connection frequently, Rabel himself pointed to his education in
legal history as the source for his functional approach: Rabel, ‘In der Schule’ (n )  f; and see
Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘ “In der Schule von Ludwig Mitteis”: Ernst Rabels rechtshistorische
Ursprünge’, ()  RabelsZ ,  f.
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damages did not automatically violate German public policy, relied on an extensive
analysis of the various functions of punitive damages and its German functional
equivalents.201 A Californian Court of Appeal relieved a French company of the
requirement that it attain workers’ compensation insurance from a Californian
insurer, holding that the manifest function of the requirement—that employers
should be adequately insured by a solvent company—could be attained by diﬀerent
means, in this case insurance with a French company.202 Western courts are now
more willing than before to recognize Islamic divorce based on unilateral
repudiation because it is functionally equivalent to divorce in Western democracies,
which, though nominally consensual, can eﬀectively be brought about against or
without the will of one of the spouses.203 Between EU member states, community
law restricts the application of mandatory norms of the forum law if the foreign
law contains functionally equivalent norms.204 In all these cases, the tolerance for
foreign law is brought about by the recognition of functional equivalence.
At the same time, functionalist comparison can aid in critiquing foreign law,
especially when a legal system insists on its cultural autonomy. For the sake of
plurality and autonomy, critical strands in comparative law often invoke culture
against functionalism. But culture is sometimes invented and sometimes undesir-
able. Distinguishing ‘good’ from ‘bad’ culture is diﬃcult for an insider lacking
a critical perspective, as well as for an outsider lacking suﬃcient insight. Func-
tionalist comparative law can be helpful here in preparing the ground for critique,
because it combines two important perspectives: awareness of culture on the one
hand, and a perspective from outside on the other. By reconstructing legal culture
in functional terms, functional comparative law helps preserve the culture’s other-
ness while making it commensurable with our own law—we see the foreign law’s
functions and dysfunctions, both manifest and latent, and we know from com-
parison how else these eﬀects can be brought about. The method does not provide
us with the tools to evaluate the foreign law. But without the groundwork laid by
functionalist comparisons, such evaluation is hard to formulate.
On the other hand, functionalist comparative law helps less in critiquing one’s
own law. The reason is again functional equivalence: Because we cannot say easily
whether a foreign law is better than our own, recognizing diﬀerent solutions
abroad does not show us deﬁciencies at home. Functionalist comparison can open
201 BGH ( June ), BGHZ , ; English translation in ()  International Legal
Materials .
202 Tucci v Club Mediterranee, SA,  Cal App. th ,  f.
203 See eg Mathias Rohe, ‘The Application of Islamic Family Law in German Courts and its
Compatibility with German Public Policy’, in Jürgen Basedow and Nadjma Yassari (eds), Iranian
Family and Succession Laws and their Application in German Courts (), ,  ﬀ. But see Cass Civ
( February ), D , .
204 Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon, ‘De nouvelles fonctions pour l’équivalence en droit international
privé?’, in Le droit international privé: esprit et méthodes. Mélanges en l’honneur de Paul Lagarde (),
,  ﬀ.
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our eyes to alternative solutions, but it cannot tell us whether those alternative
solutions are better or not. Functionalism can provide us with a view of our own
law from the outside, but whether what we thus see is deﬁcient must be determined
by other criteria. Functionalism can be critical of doctrinalism by revealing the
contingency of any one doctrine, but it cannot show a way towards law without
any doctrine, and it cannot itself provide such law.
Finally, functionalism is unhelpful in various respects in which critique may
be desirable. First, functionalism does not help in evaluating functionality and
purposes.205 Quite to the contrary, in showing that other societies pursue the same
goals by diﬀerent means, it may reinforce our conviction that certain purposes are
somehow necessary. Second, functionalism does not help us much in a funda-
mental critique of law. Functionalism may show how other societies fulﬁl certain
needs with other institutions than law, but it cannot provide alternatives to the
functionalist thinking inherent to our thinking about law. Third, with its emphasis
on understanding the status quo and on apolitical analysis, functionalist com-
parative law is of little use for political governance projects.206 Fourth, because
functionalist comparative law presumes separate societies and separate legal sys-
tems as objects of comparison, it is unable to conceptualize the way in which these
systems and societies are interdependent and overlap, a growing problem under
conditions of globalization. Fifth, functionalist comparison is unable to account
for tensions within legal systems, at least so long as it focuses on the relations
between whole legal systems rather than on legal subsystems. All of these are
real shortcomings, not only of the functional method in comparative law, but of
traditional comparative law at large, and to this extent critiques of the functional
method that are really aimed at mainstream comparative law are justiﬁed. But it
remains doubtful whether any method of comparative law can fare better here.
IV. Conclusion
...................................................................................................................................................................
Section III has rendered some surprising results. Generally, one assumes that the
strength of the functional method lies in its emphasis on similarities, its aspirations
towards the evaluation and uniﬁcation of law. This is the main reason why its
205 Hill,  Oxford Journal of Legal Studies  f.
206 David Kennedy, ‘New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International
Governance’,  Utah LR ,  ﬀ; but see, for a promising proposal, Richard Buxbaum, ‘Die
Rechtsvergleichung zwischer nationalem staat und internationaler Wirtschaft’, ()  RabelsZ ,
 ﬀ.
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supporters since Rabel have considered it such a powerful tool, and why opponents
have felt the need to combat it so ﬁercely. Yet the discussion has revealed that the
functional method emphasizes diﬀerences within similarity; it does not provide
criteria for evaluation; and it supplies powerful arguments against uniﬁcation.
Further, one generally assumes that the functional method does not account suf-
ﬁciently for culture and is reductionist. But as the analysis demonstrates, the func-
tional method not only requires us to look at culture, but it enables us to formulate
general laws without having to abstract the speciﬁcities.
These misunderstandings about the utility of the functional method arise
because comparatists unknowingly use diﬀerent concepts of function, as demon-
strated in Section II. Because the relation between these diﬀerent concepts within
the method was unclear, some of the hopes placed in the functional method were
unrealistic. Comparatists’ shift from a sociologically inspired to a legally inspired
concept of function within the functional method occurs quite precisely when they
move from description to systematizing and evaluation. A method reconstructed
plainly on the basis of functional equivalence as the most robust of the concepts
and following a constructive epistemology can make fewer claims in these last four
areas; in fact, it can suggest reasons for caution and restraint. At the same time,
such a method is less open to some of the criticism levelled against the functional
method as an explanatory tool.
Other disciplines have discarded functionalism only after utilizing its insights.
Functionalist comparative law has not yet made suﬃcient use of the beneﬁts of
functionalism. This study can only hint at the possibilities, but its ﬁndings suggest
that a more methodologically aware functionalism will provide us with better
insights into the functioning of law. In addition, functionalism in comparative law
may well be immune to some of the criticism voiced against functionalism in the
social sciences. After all, law is a normative discipline for which teleology may be
useful or even necessary. Of course, this requires the construction of a more robust
functional method. This chapter proposes to base such a method on equivalence
functionalism and on an epistemology of constructive functionalism. Whether
such a method can hold its own—against the uncritical version of functionalism
on the one hand, and against the alternatives to functionalism on the other—
remains to be seen. But the attempt seems well worth the eﬀort.
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